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SUNLIGHT ON IRAN:
HOW REDUCTIVE STANDARDS OF
MATERIALITY EXCUSE INCOMPLETE




Barclays Bank Plc paid a $298-million fine for violating U.S.
sanctions on Iran and other terrorism-sponsoring countries.' A billboard
asking "Today's Work, Tomorrow's Nuclear Iran?" featuring pictures of
Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Caterpillar Inc. equipment
was erected near Caterpillar Inc.'s corporate headquarters in Illinois.2 The
* Associate Professor and Director, Business and Transactional Law Center, Washburn University
School of Law. This article builds on What's in Your Portfolio? U.S. Investors Are Unknowingly
Financing State Sponsors of Terrorism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1151 (Summer 2010) in which I presented
original empirical research demonstrating that reporting companies are not disclosing their operations
in countries subject to comprehensive U.S. sanctions. This article uses the lack of disclosure of
operations in Iran, established in What's in Your Portfolio and elsewhere, to argue for more general
doctrinal reformulation. I would like to thank Myrl Duncan, Linda Elrod, Bill Merkel, Cheryl Nichols,
Bill Rich, and David Rubenstein for their helpful comments, Mike Schwartz, Brad Borden and Marc
Miller for their terrific advice, and United Against Nuclear Iran (I serve as a member of their Advisory
Board). I would also like to thank Rebecca Sanders for her wonderful research assistance. Finally, I
would like to thank my husband, David A. Westbrook, for his encouragement and his very insightful
suggestions. All mistakes are my own.
1. Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Barclays Bank Plc Agrees to Forfeit $298 Million in
Connection with Violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the Trading with
the Enemy Act (Aug. 18, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/August/10-crm-
933.html (announcing that Barclays had agreed to forfeiture of $298 million, a public admission of its
illegal acts, and the implementation of stringent compliance measures to settle charges that it conducted
illegal transactions on behalf of customers from Iran, Cuba, Sudan and other countries sanctioned in
programs administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)).
2. Press Release, United Against Nuclear Iran, UANI Announces Launch of Peoria Billboard
Calling on Caterpillar to End Business in Iran (Feb. 16, 2010), available at http://www.unitedagainst
nucleariran.com/press-releases/uani-announces-launch-peoria-billboard-calling-caterpillar-end-
business-iran. Ten days after the billboard was erected, Caterpillar announced that it would cease all
business in Iran. Profiting from Iran, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12,2010) available at http://www.nytimes.com
/interactive/201 0/03/06/world/iran-sanctions.html (interactive database listing 74 companies that do
business in Iran and with the U.S. Government).
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Wall Street Journal reported that technology from Nokia Corp. and
Siemens AG was being used by Iran to spy on Iranians and crack down on
dissent, and included the YouTube video of the killing of female Iranian
music student, Neda Agha Soltan, in the online article. Media campaigns
were launched to pressure General Electric Company, Huntsman
Corporation, and Ingersoll Rand Plc to cease operations in Iran.4 Should
investors have known that those companies were doing business in Iran
before the negative publicity or fines? Certainly. Had these companies
disclosed their involvement in Iran? Hardly.5 How, in a world of publicly
traded securities and ostensibly transparent markets, did this happen?
It would be tough to imagine an issue more clearly important to the
public and risky for investors than a company's business operations in Iran.
Nuclear threat, sponsor of global terrorism, and human rights violator, Iran
is the object of comprehensive U.S. and international sanctions; its
government is unstable; there is a high risk of recurring violence; and there
are even suggestions that military action may be taken against it. It is
illegal for a U.S. person, either a corporation or a business, to do business
in Iran. 6 However, most U.S. laws do not apply to foreign companies,
including foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies. If their home countries
do not impose restrictions on Iranian activities, such companies may do
business in Iran and sell securities in the U.S. markets. As a result, U.S.
investors may own stock in a company that either directly or indirectly
conducts business in Iran.
Although business activities in Iran are important to the public, it
requires an enormous wellspring of investor demands and
nongovernmental organization (NGO) action to elicit disclosure. So much
investor effort is needed, in part, because the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) has refrained from identifying business in Iran as
"material," which is a key factor in determining whether particular
information about a public company must be disclosed. It appears the SEC
does not consider business in Iran to have a significant direct financial
impact on a company.
3. Christopher Rhoads & Loretta Chao, Iran 's Web Spying Aided By Western Technology, WALL
ST. J. (Jun. 22, 2009), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/NAWSJPUB:SB1245626687773356
53.html#articleTabs%3Darticle.
4. UANI's Initiatives, Campaigns and Accomplishments, UNITED AGAINST NUCLEAR IRAN,
http://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/our-initiatives (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
5. Nokia (orp. and Siemens did make some minimal disclosure of the fact that some sales were
made to Iran, with no details and no discussion of the risks. Nokia Corp., Annual Report (Form 20-F),
at 47 (Mar. 20, 2008) (the same language is used for several years); Siemens AG, Annual Report (Form
20-F), at 11-12 (Nov. 28, 2007) (also asserting that such operations do not represent a material
investment risk). For a more general discussion of non-disclosure of business operations in state
sponsors of terrorism, see generally Amy Deen Westbrook, What s in Your Portfolio? U.S. Investors
Are Unknowingly Financing State Sponsors oJ Terrorism, 59 DE PAUL IL. REV. 1151 (2010) (presenting
empirical evidence of a low corporate disclosure rate of business activities in Cuba, Iran and Sudan).
6. See generally I ranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 560 (2009).
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Thus, until the financial cost of doing business in Iran becomes
undeniable, companies do not disclose. Investors invest on the basis of
inadequate information. Business that the United States wants to
discourage is, in fact, encouraged by the provision of capital at prices that
do not include (price in) recognition of doing business in a state sponsor of
terrorism. When the risks become reality, companies, and by extension
investors, lose money.' When a company's business in Iran is not
disclosed to investors, it constitutes a failure of the regulatory disclosure
regime established under the securities laws and enforced by the SEC.
How did this happen, and what is to prevent it from happening again?
Answering these questions requires some understanding of the
mandatory disclosure regime imposed on publicly traded companies by the
federal securities laws. In particular, the regulatory concept of
"materiality" is used to help define what a company is required to tell the
public about its business, and conversely, what a company is allowed to
keep secret. The concept of materiality, however, is not rigidly or even
clearly defined. Regulatory understandings of what is material - and
therefore, as a practical matter, what must be disclosed - have shifted over
the years. In its most basic formulation, materiality means that the
information is likely to be significant to a reasonable investor in making an
investment decision.8 In practice, if a business activity does not have a
current, quantifiable impact, companies tend to avoid disclosure. As
discussed below, when it comes to operations in Iran within a multinational
group, disclosure generally has not been required unless and until the issue
becomes so important that it has substantial financial repercussions, such as
legal proceedings or regulatory compliance costs, that presumably would
affect share prices. At that point, the operations are identified as
"material," and disclosure is required.
Companies doing business in Iran often successfully maintain that
their Iranian operations have negligible effect on the bottom line, and
therefore do not need to be disclosed.' Even though it seems implausible
that companies are doing business in a state as problematic as Iran without
making money, and that it just as unlikely that U.S. investors do not care if
companies are engaged in business forbidden to the investors themselves,
the lack of a current, quantifiable impact seems to be dispositive in almost
7. In addition to the large monetary penalty that Barclays Bank Plc is paying, the price of its
American Depository Shares traded on the New York Stock Exchange (ticker symbol: BCSPR)
declined in heavy trading on August 18, 2010, when the settlement was announced, even though the
Dow Jones Industrial Average (ticker symbol: DJI) was slightly up that day. See Big Charts, Market
Watch, http://bigcharts.marketwatch.com/historical/default.asp?detect=I &symbol=bcspr&close-date-8
/18/2010&x-41&y=12 (for Barclays Bank Plc) and http://bigcharts.marketwatch.com/historical/default.
asp?detect=1&symbol dji&close date=8/1 8/2010&x=30&y=28 (for the Dow Jones Industrial
Average).
8. See discussion and notes infra Part II.A.4.
9. See discussion and notes infra Parts IV.A, IV.D.2.
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all cases of business in Iran.
The resulting lack of disclosure of company operations in Iran thus
illustrates the failure of a reductive understanding of materiality. In
particular, understanding materiality in purely quantitative terms is
inadequate because reasonable investors want to know some information
that is not easily quantifiable. In addition, exclusive reliance on
quantification implausibly presumes sound accounting and efficient
financial markets, both presumptions that were called into question in the
recent financial crisis. Limiting materiality to significant effects on
revenues may also undercut other U.S. policies, such as national security
concerns in the case of Iran, and is at odds with the plain meaning of
securities laws. In addition, such a simplified understanding of materiality
may not trigger disclosure of changing circumstances, so investors are not
adequately apprised of issues that have not yet, but may later, impose
significant costs.
This article argues that the SEC should cease accepting company
interpretations that deny materiality of information based almost solely on
a lack of currently quantifiable costs. The SEC should make it clear that
materiality means what the Supreme Court said decades ago: "a substantial
likelihood that the disclosure . . . would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total' mix of
information made available . . .."" The Court's formulation includes more
than simple financial impact.
This Article explores why the SEC's reductive understanding of
materiality is hindering disclosure of investor priorities, as demonstrated by
how the securities laws deal with business operations in Iran. Part II
provides an overview of the duty to disclose under U.S. securities laws, as
delineated by the doctrine of materiality, and reviews past efforts to define
materiality, especially in the contexts of management integrity and climate
change issues. Part III discusses how business operations in Iran belatedly
become material, to the cost of investors and U.S. interests. Part IV argues
that the reductive standard requiring a direct quantifiable impact as a sine
qua non of materiality is bad as a matter of law and policy. The Article
concludes with a recommendation that the SEC should reassert a broad
understanding of materiality and require disclosure when it is needed by
investors. If you are guiding a car backing into a parking space, you should
not wait until the car hits the curb before you say "stop."
10. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
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II. THE DOCTRINE OF MATERIALITY
A. THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE AS LIMITED BY THE DOCTRINE OF
MATERIALITY
1. Disclosure-Based Securities Regulation
Part of sweeping financial reform in the wake of the 1929 stock
market crash, the Securities Act of 1933" and the Securities Exchange Act
of 193412 (together, the Securities Acts) were enacted to prevent a
recurrence of financial catastrophe by requiring disclosure of information
to investors and imposing penalties for false or misleading disclosures.' 3
Moreover, the Securities Exchange Act created the SEC to interpret the
statutes, to promulgate regulations and rules as needed, and to enforce the
regime.' 4
The resulting body of securities law establishes an elaborate system of
mandatory disclosure requirements. The emphasis on the disclosure of
information in the securities laws' 5 is often associated with the words of
Louis Brandeis: "Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric
light the most efficient policeman."" In a well ordered society, or market,
making information publicly available is the best way to ensure good
behavior. Accordingly, the securities laws require companies to tell their
investors, their owners and providers of capital, what the company does.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2009).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2009).
13. There is a vibrant debate regarding the purpose of the securities laws centering on whether
there is a public interest obligation in addition to the investor protection mandate. See James D.
Redwood, Qualitative Materiality under the SEC Proxy Rules and the Fifth Amendment: A Disclosure
Accident Waiting to Happen or Two Ships Passing in the Night?, 1992 Wsc. L. REv. 315, 329-330
(1992) (arguing for a public interest purpose); Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange
Commission and Corporate Social Responsibility, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1197, 1203-04 (1999)
(suggesting that the SEC's public interest disclosure power is separate from and broader than its
investor protection disclosure power). For a discussion of SEC resistance to a broader social
disclosure/public interest agenda, see Faith Stevelman Kahn, Legislatures, Courts and the SEC:
Reflections on Silence and Power in Corporate and Securities Law, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1107, 1134
(1997); Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., The SEC and the New Disclosure, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 50, 58
(1977).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2010).
15. Louis Loss, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION
32-45 (Aspen 5th ed. 2004) (discussing "The Battle of the Philosophies" in which Brandeis' disclosure
philosophy was chosen over Professor William 0. Douglas' arguments for greater control over the
securities being offered to the public).
16. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914).
Felix Frankfurter, who was also strongly associated with the disclosure mechanism, commented "rt]he
Securities Act is strong insofar as publicity is potent; it is weak insofar as publicity is not enough."
Felix Frankfurter, The Federal Securities Act: II, FORTUNE, Aug. 1933, at 55.
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The U.S. system of federal securities regulation is disclosure-based,
not "merit-based" 7 ; it requires that the information be provided to
investors, but does not regulate soundness of investments.' The regime
thus assumes that well-informed investors, not the government, should
decide where capital should be invested' 9 and that a market mechanism
should control the allocation of capital, thereby guiding the direction of
business.2 0 From the corporate perspective, disclosure may be viewed as an
obligation that companies undertake in order to avail themselves of the
privilege of selling securities to the public. 2' From society's perspective,
the perspective of the law, information helps ensure that capital formation
is responsible.22
2. The Need for Limits on the Duty to Disclose
A document cannot represent literally everything about a company's
existing business and prospects, both good and bad. The world is too
complicated. Even if such a document could be written, who could read it?
17. Many state "blue-sky" laws were merit-based. The federal and state systems continue to
coexist, but the federal system increasingly preempts state regulation. The scope of state securities
regulation was significantly curtailed in 1996 with the passage of the National Securities Markets
Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA), which generally preempts state regulation that requires
registration or qualification of most publicly traded securities listed on a national exchange. National
Securities Markets Improvement Act § 102 (amending Section 1 8 of the Securities Act of 1933), 15
U S.C§ 77r(b)(1)(A).
18. The disclosure based system has of course not been without critics. See, e.g., George J.
Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132 (1973); David J. Schulte, The Debatable Case for Securities Disclosure
Regulation, 13 J. CORP. L. 535, 536 (1988). This debate is tied to the merits of the Efficient Capital
Markets Hypothesis, a full discussion of which is beyond the scope of this article.
19. S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 6-7 (1933), quoted in H.R. REP. No. 98-910, vol. 1, at 556-57 (1977).
This transfers the decision about whether to invest based on that information to the investor, and
preserves individual choice, as opposed to "command and control"-type regulations which have
historically dominated environmental regulation. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as
Environmental Regdation: TRI and Perfbrmance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm? 89
GEO. L. J. 257, 293 (2001); MARY GRAHAM, INNOVATIONS IN AM. GOv'T PROGRAM, INFORMATION AS
RISK REGULATION: LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE 11 (2001), available at http://www.innovations.
harvard.edulcache/documents/0/74.pdf
20. A model in which the government mandates company disclosure is a form of civil regulation in
which society makes the choice of which behavior to support and which to eschew. John Parkinson,
Disclosure and Corporate Social and Environmental Performance: Competitiveness and Enterprise in
a Broader Social Frame, 3 J. CORP. L. STUD. 3, 4 (2003). This transfer is seen as efficient, both in
terms of regulatory resources and decision-making. Karkkainen, supra note 19, at 293.
21. David Monsma & Timothy Olson, Muddling through Counterfactual Materiality and
Divergent Disclosure: The Necessary Search for a Duty to Disclose Material Non-Financial
Information, 26 STAN. ENvTL. L. J. 137, 139 (2007) (arguing that publicly held corporations assume
obligations of public trust and accountability when they sell stock to the public).
22. For an excellent discussion of disclosure related costs, incentives and benefits, see Douglas G.
Baird, Robert H. Gertner, & Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and the Law 198 99 (1994) (explaining
the "unraveling principle' in the context of the securities laws).
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As such, the general obligation to disclose is limited both by a list of
specific requirements23 and by a general notion of what is relevant to
investor decisions: that which is "material."
The disclosure requirements may reflect a regulatory agenda, 2 4 that is,
the SEC's evolving ideas about what is important to investors and, more
broadly, the public interest in sound markets. For example, the 2002
Sarbanes Oxley Act requires publicly traded companies to disclose whether
they have financial experts on their audit committees. The goal of this
disclosure requirement is to encourage companies to place such experts on
their committees.26 Similarly, the rules and regulations requiring disclosure
of executive compensation arrangements 27 have sought to mobilize
shareholder outrage in order to reduce compensation packages.29
Thus, over time, as issues arise and are addressed, disclosure
regulation tends to accumulate.30 Petitions to add items to the list of
mandatory disclosure are common." Petitions to remove items are rarer.
There is always the possibility that the SEC, seduced by the relative ease
and efficiency of requiring disclosure, will require companies to disclose
more and more information, until the cost is unduly burdensome to
companies and/or there is so much information in the marketplace that
investors are unable to sift through it to get to what is "important." In this
way, disclosure is like a Victorian house that has accommodated
generations of owners with numerous additions and small changes, getting
bigger and more awkward each time.32 When disclosure results in
23. See discussion of Reg S-K infra Part 3.
24. Paula J. Dailey, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 34 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 1089, 1096 (2007) (noting an increasing trend in securities regulation to use disclosure to affect
firms' behavior).
25. Id. at 1097 (discussing 15 U.S.C. §§ 7264-65). Companies tend to "manage what they
measure." Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage What
You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1342-45 (1996).
26. Dailey, supra note 24, at 1096.
27. See, e.g., Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Securities Act Release No.
8732A, Exchange Act Release No. 54302A, Investment Act Release No. 27444A, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158
(Sept. 8, 2006) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 228, 229, et al.), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/20
06/33-8732afr.pdf
28. LUCIEN ARYE BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION at 64-66 (2004) (discussing "outrage costs").
29. See Sean M. Donahue, Executive Compensation: The New Executive Compensation Disclosure
Rules Do Not Result in Complete Disclosure, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 59, (2008).
30. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); Dodd Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
31. For two examples from 2010, see Request for Rulemaking to Require Mutual Fund Companies
to Provide a Single Day Accrual Rate/Mil Rate for Every Day of Every Week, submitted by: Park
National Bank, Petition No. 6-601 (Mar. 22, 2010) available at http://sec.gov/rules/petitions/2010/petn4
-601 .pdf; Request for Rulemaking to Amend Regulation S-K and/or Form 10-K to Add a New Section
Entitled "Political Influence," submitted by James Evan Dallas, Petition No, 4-593 (Jan. 22, 2010)
available at http://sec.gov/rules/petitions/2010/petn4-593.pdf.
32. Such Victorian-era houses are also very hard to sell.
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"information overload" it is no longer effective.3 3
3. How Does Disclosure Work?
The Securities Acts, as further defined by SEC rules and regulations,
require companies that sell securities to the public to "file," i.e., disclose or
report, information with the SEC at certain times. 34 "Reporting companies"
or "public companies"35 include companies that have listed securities on a
U.S. exchange,c36companies with a nexus to interstate commerce that have
at least 500 shareholders and $10 million in assets, 37 and companies that
have made a registered public offering in the United States.38
Foreign companies39 that avail themselves of the U.S. markets are
subject to disclosure requirements, on slightly different forms, that are very
similar to those applicable to U.S. issuers. 40  Consequently, foreign
companies, to which U.S. law generally does not apply (and which
therefore need not abide by U.S. sanctions on Iran or other countries) are
nonetheless subject to U.S. disclosure laws if they sell securities in the U.S.
markets.
A reporting company is required to disclose specified information
upon the initial issuance of securities,41 periodically thereafter, 42 and
33. WESLEY A. MAGAT, & W. KIP ViSCUtSI, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES To REGULATION 90-
91(1992).
34. Securities Act of 1933 §19(c), 15 U.S.C. §77s(a) (2002) (granting the SEC authority to make
'such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this title"); Exchange Act
§23(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (2006) (granting the SEC authority "to make such rules and
regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this [title]").
35. For purposes of this article, a company that sells securities to the public is the same as a
reporting company.
36. Exchange Act§§ 12(a), 13(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(a), 78m(a) (2002)
37. Exchange Act § 12(g)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (2002).
38. Exchange Act § 15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 780(d) (2002).
39. A "foreign private issuer" is any foreign issuer (other than a foreign government) unless over
half of the issuer's stock is held by U.S. residents, the majority of its officers oT directors are U.S.
citizens, more than half of its assets are located in the United States or its business is administered
principally in the United States. See Exchange Act Rule 3b-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4. As of December
31, 2009, there were nearly 1000 foreign private issuers registered with the SEC. See, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM'N, FOREIGN COMPANIES REGISTERED AND REPORTING WITH THE U.S. SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Dec. 31, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/
foreignalpha2009.pdf
40. Peter M. Friedman, Note: Risky Business: Can Faulty Country Risk Factors in the Prospectus
ofU.S.-Listed Chinese Companies Raise Violations of U.S. Securities Law?, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 241, 257 (2005) (noting that the Securities Act makes no explicit distinction between U.S. and non-
U.S. issuers in the disclosure provisions, but that the SEC has made a number of ad hoc provisions that
treat foreign companies differently).
41. See Securities Act of 1933, § 5,7,10, Schedules. A and B, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77g, 77j, 77aa
(1994). The registration process for issuing securities to the public includes the production of a
prospectus and a registration statement (using for example Form S-1 or Form S-3, or, in the case of
non-U.S. issuers, Form F-I or Form F-3) in order to provide investors with the information they need to
make an informed decision about purchasing the securities.
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whenever there is an extraordinary corporate event.43 Once reported to the
SEC, this information is usually made immediately available44 to the public
using the SEC website and its Electronic Data Gathering Analysis and
Retrieval (EDGAR) system.
A key source of specific disclosure requirements under the federal
securities laws is Regulation S-K (Reg S-K).45 Reg S-K specifies a number
of "line item" categories of information that must be disclosed in the non-
financial portions of registration statements and periodic reports: 46
information about the company's business; 47 the company's securities;4 8 the
company's financial data;49  the company's management and certain
security holders;" and other information from the registration statement
and prospectus.5 '
Some of the "line item" areas of disclosure pertain to the disclosure of
information that cannot be reliably quantified at the time of reporting. For
example, Item 101 (Description of Business) requires disclosure of the
"general development of business" 52  and a "narrative description of
business"" including, "to the extent material to an understanding of the
42. Exchange Act, §§ 12(b)(1), 12(g)(1), 13, 15(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(b)(1), 78(g)(1), 78m, 78o(d)
(1994). This includes filing annual (for example, Form 10-K or in the case of non-U.S. issuers, form
20-F reports) and quarterly (Form 10-Q) reports. It also includes proxy statements filed in connection
with shareholders meetings pursuant to Section 14(a).
43. Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 14(a), 14(d), 14(f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(a), 78n(d), 78n(f). Information
must be disclosed in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. SEC Regulation S-X.
17 C.F.R. pt. 229 (2008). The registration statement (upon issuance of the securities) and then Forms
10-K (annually), 10Q (quarterly), 14-A (for proxy statements), and 8-K (current reports) form the
bedrock of U.S. reporting company disclosure. Non-U.S. issuers primarily use Forms 20-F (for annual
reports) and 6-K (current reports). Since 1982, the SEC has used an integrated disclosure system to
clarify and simplify the required disclosures. See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities
Act Rel. No. 6383, Exchange Act Rel. No. 18524, 24 SEC Docket 1262, 1262, 1300 (Mar. 3, 1982)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 229).
44. Some information included in correspondence and petitions may be redacted at the request of
the company.
45. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-229.702 (2009). For small businesses, the SEC
promulgated Regulation S-B. Regulation S-B, 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.10-228.702 (2009). The SEC also
promulgated Regulation S-X to provide instructions about quantitative disclosures. 17 C.F.R. pt. 210
(2008).
46. Regulation S-K, Rule 10, 17 C.F.R. § 229.10 (2009).
47. See Regulation S-K, Items 101-103, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.101-229.103 (2009).
48. Regulation S-K, Items 201-202, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.201-229.202 (2009).
49. See Regulation S-K, Items 301-308, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.301-229.308T (2009).
50. See Regulation S-K, Items 401-407, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.401-229.407 (2009).
51. See Regulation S-K, Items 501-512, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.501-229.512 (2009).
52. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(a) (describing the general development of the business of the registrant).
53. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c) (describing the business done and intended to be done by the
registrant). Item 101 also instructs companies to describe "any risks attendant to rtheir] foreign
operations." 17 C.F.R. § 229(d)(1)(3). The instructions to Item 101 specifically instruct companies to
"take into account both quantitative and qualitative factors." 17 C.F.R. § 229.101 ("situations may arise
where information should be disclosed about a segment, although the information in quantitative terms
may not appear significant to the registrant's business taken as a whole.").
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registrant's business taken as a whole," 54 information about where a
company does business, the principal markets for the company's
products, and the sources of the raw materials used by the company.
Item 103 of Reg S-K (Legal Proceedings) requires disclosure of "any
material pending legal proceedings . . . to which the registrant or any of its
subsidiaries is a party," including any such proceeding "known to be
contemplated by governmental authorities" which is not routine or
incidental to the company's business.57
Item 303 (Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Results of Operations) requires a broad discussion of the
company's operations from the management's perspective. Item 303(a)
thus requires the company to disclose "currently known trends, events, and
uncertainties that are reasonably expected to have material effects" on
results of the company's operations or to cause a material increase or
decrease in the company's liquidity or capital resources.
In addition, a company that sells securities to the public in the United
States is required by Item 503(c) to disclose risk factors that may affect the
issuer of the securities being offered.59 In many cases, investor concerns
54. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1). Item 101 does, in several cases, provide specific numerical
benchmarks for the disclosure of particular information. For example, Item 101 requires that amount or
percentage of revenue contributed by a company's product or service must be described if it accounted
for "10 percent or more of consolidated revenue in any of the law three fiscal years, or 15% or more of
consolidate revenue if the total revenue was not greater than $50,000,000 during any such fiscal years."
17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(i).
55. 17 C.F.R. * 229.101(c)(1)(i).
56. 17 C.F.R. § 229. 101(c)(1)(iii).
57. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103. The instructions indicate that qualitative factors, even if not reliably
quantifiable, should be considered. See Yvonne Ching Ling Lee, The Elusive Concept of 'Materiality'
under U.S. Federal Securities Laws, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 661, 671-72 (2004).
58. Concept Release on Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and
Operations, Exchange Act Rel. No. 6211, 52 Fed. Reg. 13715, 13717 (Apr. 26, 1987). Regulation S-K,
Item 303(a)(1) (Liquidity), for example, instructs companies to "[identify] any known trends or any
known demands, commitments, events or uncertainties that will result in or that are reasonable likely to
result in the registrant's liquidity increasing or decreasing in any material way." For example, if
substantial numbers of investors ceased purchasing or divested themselves of the securities of a
company because of operations of which investors disapproved, such investor actions could have a
"foreseeable material impact on the company's ability to raise cash through the sale of its securities,"
and the company would be required to disclose those material effects. Memorandum from David B.H.
Martin, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, in response to letter dated April 2, 2001
from Congressman Wolf (May 8, 2001) (hereinafter "Martin Memorandum") reprinted in 33rd Annual
Institute on Securities Regulation, November 8-10, 2001 at 1127 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course
Handbook Ser. No. 1125, 2001). The Martin Memorandum is discussed in more detail in Part
D(4)(E)(I) below. The instructions to Item 303(a) further clarify that "[fjoreign private registrants also
shall disclose briefly any governmental economic, fiscal, monetary, or political policies or factors that
haxe materially affected or could materially affect, directly or indirectly, their operations or investments
by United States nationals." Regulation S-K, Instructions to Item 303(a), Instruction I11. 17 C.F.R. §
229.303 (2010).
59. 17 C.F .R. §229.503(c) (2008). Since 2005, "Risk Factors" have been included in quarterly as
well as annual reports. Securities Act Release No. 8591 A, Exchange Act Release No. 52056A,
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center around behavior that is inherently risky: operations in state sponsors
of terrorism, manufacturing using certain chemicals, etc.
Even if a particular type of information is not required to be disclosed
under a Reg S-K line item, Exchange Act Rule 12b-20 provides: "[li]n
addition to the information expressly required to be included in a statement
or report, there shall be added such further material information, if any, as
may be necessary to make the required statements, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made not misleading."6 0 A similar
gap-filling provision is included in Rule 408 under the Securities Act.61
Finally, disclosure of investor priorities may be triggered by the
inclusive anti-fraud provision of Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 ("Employment
of Manipulative and Deceptive Practices"). 62  Rule 10b-5 regulates the
information that a company must disclose about its activities by creating
liability not only for making "any untrue statement of material fact," but
also for omitting "to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading" in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security.63
4. Materiality and the Scope of Disclosure
Thus, a duty to disclose information arises when a statute, rule or
regulation specifically requires disclosure, and that duty is often limited to
disclosing "material" instances of the information required. In addition,
more general rules and antifraud liability require companies to disclose
information if needed to "cure" some other statement that the company has
made that otherwise would be inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading.64
Materiality, then, is a principle of distinction: material information (of
various sorts) must be disclosed, while information of the same sort, which
is not material, need not be disclosed. But where is the line drawn? How
does materiality limit the duty to disclose?
Investment Act Release No. 26993A, "Securities Offering Reform," 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722, 44,786-87
(Aug. 3, 2005).
60. Exchange Act Rule 12b-20, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (2010).
61. Rule 408 of the Securities Act has identical wording except that it applies to registration
statements instead of statements and reports. 17 C.F.R. § 230.408 (2010).
62. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2010).
63. Id. There is no preexisting duty to disclose all material facts, but there is a duty to speak if the
information disclosed would otherwise be materially misleading. So, for example, one might argue that
disclosing where a company does business and omitting subsidiary operations in Iran might by negative
inference cause investors to believe that there are not operations in Iran. This omission would result in
liability if operations in Iran are material.
64. Or when a corporate insider trades on confidential information in violation of a fiduciary duty.
See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
23Winter 2011
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
Stated most generally, material information "consists of those facts
wx hich a reasonable investor would consider significant in making an
investment decision." ' As suggested aboxve, the duty to disclose is limited,
in the first instance. by the statute. rule, or regulation that requires
disclosure. Although what is material and what must be disclosed may be
difficult to distinguish,66 there is no general affirmative requirement that a
company disclose all material information." For example, preliminary
merger negotiations may be material, but do not have to be disclosed.6
Materiality functions as a filter,69 limiting the disclosure required by a rule
or regulation to information that investors need to know.70
Of course, materiality is not always needed. Disclosure of certain
information may be required exven if the information is not in fact
material.7 Companies must make some disclosures required by Reg S-K
whether or not the information is believed to be important to investors in
any particular instance. The SEC has determined ex ante that many
investors will find the required information relevant, and that consistent
disclosure obligations make it possible to compare firms. 2 For example, a
company must disclose its expenses in connection with the issuance of
registered securities regardless of the amount.7 The rationale behind this
kind of disclosure obligation "is that the information is likely to be
important to investors, [even though] not exvery piece of information
65. THOMAS LEE HAZEN. TREATISE ON THE LASW OF SECURITIES REGUL ATION § 3 4[2] (2009 6th
ed.).
66. Donald Langevoort & G. \litu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose under Rule lOb-5, 57
VAND. L. REV. 1639, 1644 (2004). Contrary to popular belief, not all material information must be
disclosed. Patricia Sanchez Abril & Ann M. Olazabal. The Celebrity CEO: Corporate Disclosure at the
Intersection of Privacv and Securities Law. 46 HoUts. L. REV. 1545, 1582 (2010) (pointing out sexNeral
media stories that assumed any material information should be disclosed) Nlonsma & Olson, supra
note 21, at 167 (discussing this 'widely held misconception").
67. See, e.g., Gregory S. Porter. What Did You Know and When Did You Know It?: Public
Company Disclosure and the tlithical Ditties to Correct and Update, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 2199, 2239
(2000). Dale Arthur Oesterle. The Inexorable March Toward a Continuous Disclosure Requirement for
Publicly Traded Corporations: 'Are We There Yet?", 20 CARDOZO L. REV. I 35 140 (1998) (there is no
"general legal duty to disclose material facts, plans. strategies. or other information to the trading
markets").
68. Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 66.
69. Williams, supra note 13, at 1208.
70. Some scholars argue that as a sy stem, this division makes sense, since periodic disclosure was
designed to include information about events in the past that the SEC could objectively verify. Homer
Kripke, Fifty Years of Securities Regulation in Search of a Purpose, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 257, 276
(1984).
71. Ralph C. Ferrara, Richard M. Starr & Marc I. Steinberg, Disclosure of Information Bearing on
Management Integrity and Competency, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. '555 558-59 (1981).
72. See Shannon Hannes, Comparisons Among Firms: (When) Do They JustifA Mlandatorv
Disclosure?, 29 J. CORP. L. 699. 703-04 (2004).
73. 17 .F.R. §229.511 (requirement to "[f~urnish a reasonably itemized statement of all expenses
in connection xwith the issuance and distribution of the securities to be registered. other than
underwriting discounts and commissions").
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required is going to be important in every instance."74
The lack of clarity about the bounds of materiality also presents
opportunities.75  As discussed above, the idea that some things not
enumerated in Reg S-K, and not affecting current accounting, might
nevertheless need to be disclosed has been a critical part of what might
roughly be called "social disclosure" arguments.7 6 Although some scholars
consider SEC authority to require qualitatively material disclosure "quite
limited,"77 others contend that such disclosure is not only within the SEC's
authority, but actually required to fulfill the SEC's statutory mandate to
promulgate rules and regulations "as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors."78
However this academic argument is resolved, it is undeniable that the
doctrine of materiality is ambiguous, and that the SEC has broad authority
to shape the doctrine. Unsurprisingly, there have been considerable
changes in the interpretation of materiality over the years. Congress
intended, 79 the Supreme Court articulated," and the SEC has in the past
used, a broad standard of materiality. Currently, however, the SEC seems
to be recognizing a reduced standard of materiality that does not require
disclosure of non-quantifiable costs, and therefore does not elicit the
information that investors need.
74. Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 66, at note 18.
75. Many commentators believe that the SEC has deliberately "left ambiguous the effect of
applying the existing materiality standard to any specific factual situation." Joan MacLeod Heminway,
Materiality Guidance in the Context of Insider Trading: A Call/for Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1131,
1140 and note 32 (2003) (citing a plethora of instances in which the SEC has refused to specifically
define materiality). Professor Sachs has suggested that the materiality standard should measure
materiality from the standpoint of the least sophisticated investor instead of the reasonable investor in
order to protect unsophisticated investors who are duped by implausible falsehoods often using the
internet and telemarketing technology. Margaret V. Sachs, Materiality and Social Change: The Case
for Replacing 'the Reasonable Investor with 'the Least Sophisticated Investor in Inefficient Markets,
81 TUL. L. REV. 473, 474-481 (2006).
76. Sachs, supra note 75, at 492 (describing the TSC Indus. standard as "under siege").
77. Ferrara, Starr & Steinberg, supra note 71, at 557.
78. James D. Redwood, Qualitative Materiality Under the SEC Proxy Rules and the Fifth
Amendment: A Disclosure Accident Waiting to Happen or Two Ships Passing in the Night?, 1992 WiS.
L. REv. 315, 328 (1992) (noting Sections 7 and 10(c) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g and
77j(c), and Sections 12 and 14(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(b) and 78n(a), in the context of
disclosure of information about management integrity).
79. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 9 (1933) (including references to "moral responsibility to the
public"); 78 Cong. Rec. 7696 (1934) (debating how best to serve the public interest).
80. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449; Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988).
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B. DEFINING MATERIALITY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE AND
ITS APPLICATION TO MANAGEMENT INTEGRITY AND CLIMATE
CHANGE DISCLOSURE
1. Introduction
The argument over which non-financial investor priorities are material
for securities law purposes has been going on for decades. In the 1970s,
there was a surge in efforts to get the SEC to recognize issues such as
management integrity and environmental risks and impacts as material. In
addition, in 1976 the Supreme Court provided an authoritative definition of
"material" in TSC Industries Inc. v. Northway Inc., which was affirmed and
expanded to the antifraud context in Basic Inc. v. Levinson in 1988. In a
1999 Staff Accounting Bulletin, the SEC noted that materiality has both
qualitative and quantitative aspects."' In 2001, the SEC released a letter
suggesting that an even broader materiality standard was appropriate in the
context of state sponsors of terrorism.8 2 In order to understand the contrast
between these interpretations and the SEC's current acceptance of a
reductive definition of the materiality of companies' operations in Iran, it is
helpful to review some of the key interpretations, and how the SEC handled
the materiality of two other nonfinancial issues: management integrity and
climate change.
2. The Supreme Court Definition: TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.
and Basic Inc. v. Levinson
In 1976, the Supreme Court defined materiality in TSC Industries, Inc.
v. Northway, Inc." TSC Industries was decided in the context of a
shareholder claim that a proxy statement was misleading because it failed
to state that a transfer of interest from one company to another had resulted
in a change of control transaction. In clarifying the requirements of Section
14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 84 the Supreme Court ruled that, "[a]n
omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote." 85 The
Court further clarified the definition, noting that, "there must be a
81. Securities and Exchange Commission: Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45150,
17 C.F.R. § 211 (1999) [hereinafter SAB 99] (discussing failings of a purely quantitative materiality
standard).
82. See discussion infra Part E.
83. TS(Indus., 426 U.S. at 449.
84. The case was brought by Northway, a TSC Industries Inc. shareholder Llaiming that the proxy
statement used to gain approval of a proposal to liquidate and sell all of TSC Industries' assets was
incomplete and materially misleading in violation of Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a), and Rules 14a-3 and 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. §j 240.14a-3, 240. 14a-9.
85. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449.
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substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the
'total mix' of information made available."8 6 The TSC Industries standard,
therefore, requires that materiality be determined by looking at the
objective facts in dispute and then making "delicate assessments of the
inferences a reasonable shareholder would draw from a given set of facts
and the significance of those inferences to him."8 7
The Court foresaw the difficulties that might be encountered with
materiality, and specifically instructed:
Doubts as to the critical nature of information misstated or omitted will
be commonplace. And particularly in view of the prophylactic purpose
of the Rule and the fact that the content of the proxy statement is within
management's control, it is appropriate that these doubts be resolved in
favor of those the statute is designed to protect."88
The Court thus specifically instructed the SEC to err on the side of
requiring disclosure, of an inclusive materiality standard.89
In 1988, the Supreme Court adopted the TSC Industries v Northway,
Inc. standard of materiality in the antifraud context when it considered
public statements made by Combustion Engineering, Inc., and Basic
Incorporated that falsely denied the existence of preliminary merger
negotiations. 90 In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the Court held that the materiality
of information about future events depends on the expected magnitude of
the event in light of the probability that the event will occur.91
In Basic, the Court noted that the Securities Exchange Act was
enacted to protect against manipulation of stock prices, and cautioned:
Disclosure, and not paternalistic withholding of accurate information, is
the policy chosen and expressed by Congress. We have recognized time
and again, a fundamental purpose of the various Securities Acts, was to
substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat
emptor, and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the
securities industry.... The role of the materiality requirement is not to
attribute to investors a child-like simplicity, an inability to grasp the
probabilistic significance of negotiations, but to filter out essentially
useless information that a reasonable investor would not consider
significant, even as part of a larger "mix" of factors to consider in
making his investment decision. 92
86. TSCIndus., 426 U.S. at 449.
87. Id. at 450.
88. Id. at 448 (emphasis added).
89. The Court considered the danger of a materiality standard that is set too low, and noted that it
used the formulation "a reas6nable shareholder would consider" the information important, instead of
"a reasonable shareholder might consider" it important to avoid a situation in which management
simply "bur[ied] the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information."~ Id. at 448-49.
90. Basic, 485 U.S. at 232 (ongoing with respect to a Rule l0b-5 claim).
91. Id. at 238. (describing the balancing test needed).
92. Id. at 234 (citations omitted). The Court also quoted the 1934 House Report which stated
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Finally, recognizing again the difficulties inherent in a broad
materiality standard, the Court stated:
A bright-line rule indeed is easier to follow than a standard that requires
the exercise of judgment in the light of all the circumstances. But ease
of application alone is not an excuse for ignoring the purposes of the
Securities Acts and Congress' policy decisions. Any approach that
designates a single fact or occurrence as always determinative of an
inherently fact-specific finding such as materiality, must necessarily be
over inclusive or under inclusive.93
The Court also explicitly endorsed an earlier report of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce's Advisory Committee on
Corporate Disclosure which had warned the SEC "against administratively
confining materiality to a rigid formula." 94
3. StaffAccounting Bulletin No. 99 and Subsequent Case Law
In response to pressure for further clarification,95 in 1999, the SEC
released Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 (SAB 99) that explained, "a
matter is 'material' if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
person would consider it important."96 SAB 99 confronted the issue of
whether there could be an objective test, in the form of a numerical
threshold, for materiality, and found such tests were useful as a preliminary
step but not dispositive: "quantifying, in percentage terms, the magnitude
of a misstatement is only the beginning of an analysis of materiality, it
cannot appropriately be used as a substitute for a full analysis of all
"There cannot be honest markets without honest publicity. Manipulation and dishonest practices of the
market place thrive upon mystery and secrecy." Id. at 230 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1383, 73d Cong., 11
(1934)).
93. Basic, 485 U.S. at 236 (emphasis added).
94. Id. The Advisory Committee advised, "a]lthough the Committee believes that ideally it would
be desirable to have absolute certainty in the application of the materiality concept, it is its view that
such a goal is illusory and unrealistic. The materiality concept is judgmental in nature and it is not
possible to translate this into a numerical formula." Id. at note 14 (citing H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE
AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMM. TO THE SEC. AND
EXCHANGE COMM. 327 (Comm. Print 1977))
95. Notwithstanding Basic, this included pressure to adopt a bright line rule.
96. SAB 99, supra note 81 (asserting that "qualitative factors may cause misstatements of
quantitatively small amounts to be material"). Although SAB 99 did not carry the force of law, courts
have relied on it as constituting "a body of experience and informed judgment" and "persuasive
guidance." See Ganino v. Citizens Utilities Co., 228 F.3d 154, 163 (2d Cir 2000) (quoting SAB 99 and
explicitly rejecting using numerical benchmarks for assessing materiality). SAB 99 relied on other
definitions of materiality, including the one contained in the Financial Accounting Standards Board for
its Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2 which explained, "[a]n omission or misstatement
of an item in a financial report is material if, in the light of surrounding circumstances, the magnitude of
the item is such that it is probable that the judgment ot a reasonable person relying upon the report
would have been changed or influenced by the inclusion or correction of the item." SAB 99 supra note
96 (citing FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of




In SAB 99, the SEC recognized the broad character of materiality,
stating explicitly that "[q]ualitative factors may cause misstatements of
quantitatively small amounts to be material."" SAB 99 listed a number of
considerations which might make a quantitatively small misstatement in a
financial statement "material," including "whether the misstatement
concerns a segment or other portion of the registrant's business that has
been identified as playing a significant role in the registrant's operations or
profitability; whether the misstatement affects the registrant's compliance
with regulatory requirements; . . . [and] whether the misstatement involves
concealment of an unlawful transaction." 99  In addition, the SEC
specifically mentioned that demonstrated volatility in share price in
response to certain types of disclosures could "provide guidance as to
whether investors regard quantitatively small misstatements as material." 00
Overall, however, SAB 99 left unchanged the understanding of materiality
addressed by the Supreme Court in TSC Industries.10'
The Second Circuit opinion in Ganino v. Citizens Utilities Company1 02
was one of the first to apply SAB 99. The suit was brought by shareholders
against a publicly traded utility company and alleged that the company had
artificially inflated share prices by making material misstatements in its
financial statements.' 03 The Second Circuit used a broad standard of
materiality, noting that the determination depends on all relevant
circumstances and that there is no single numerical or percentage
benchmark for determining whether misstatement of revenue is material for
purposes of Rule 10b-5 claim.' 04 Ganino further explained that, although
SAB 99 did not have the force of law, it was persuasive guidance for the
understanding that misstatements of quantitatively small amounts could be
material for purposes of Rule 1Ob-5.' 05 Thus, a preliminary inquiry into the
quantitative effect of a misstatement or, presumably, omission, must be
supplemented by qualitative factors."o0
The broad standard of materiality articulated in TSC Industries, Basic,
and SAB 99 is frequently reaffirmed by the courts in cases alleging
material misstatements or failures to disclose under the Securities Acts.10 7
97. SAB 99, supra note 96.
98. Id. at 3.
99. Id. at 4.
100. Id. at 5 (reminding companies and their auditors that they should not assume that even small
intentional misstatements are immaterial).
101. Heminway, supra note 75, at 1155.
102. Ganino, 228 F.3d at 163-64.
103. Id. at 158.
104. Id.at 162.
105. Id. at 163.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., U.S. v. Ferguson, 553 F. Supp. 2d 145 (D. Conn. 2008) (holding that a misstatement
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The SEC itself regularly prosecutes reporting companies for failures to
disclose material information and asserts the quantitative and qualitative
aspects of materiality.' Most of such cases, however, center on financial
information.o' The SEC does not seem to be as willing to assert the
materiality of nonfinancial factors. This was the case with management
integrity, and again, more recently, with respect to climate change.
4. Management Integrity
Management integrity is often pointed out as an example of an
investor concern that is not financially significant in any easily quantifiable
way at the time of reporting but that is nonetheless material."o However,
the sources and bounds of a reporting company's duty to disclose
information relating to the competence and integrity of its senior managers
remain controversial.' 1
a. The Doctrine Develops
In its 1964 decision, In re Franchard,112 the SEC first"' announced
that qualitative disclosure relating to "management's competence and
integrity" was essential to an informed investment decision,114 and affirmed
is material for purposes of the securities laws as long as investors would consider the misstated facts
significant in making investment decisions, even if investors would consider other information to be
more important, in a trial relating to reports filed concerning a transaction between General Reinsurance
Corp. and American International Group, Inc.); ECA and Local 134 IBLW Joint Pension Trust of
Chicago v. JP Morgan Chase Co., 553 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2009) (Enron-related case citing Ganino for
the proposition that "qualitative factors are intended to allow for a finding of materiality if the
quantitative size of the misstatement is small, but the effect of the misstatement is large").
108. See, e.g., SEC v. Escala Group, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 2646, 2009 WL 2365548, slip op. at 8
(S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2009) (in which the court agreed with the SEC that "materiality has both a
quantitative and a qualitative component and it is an error to rely exclusively on a single numerical or
percentage benchmark to determine materiality").
109. See, e.g., ECA, 553 F.3d at 194 (relating to a mischaracterization on a bank's financial
statements).
110. See STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSiS 45
(2d ed. 2008); HAZEN, supra note 65, at §3.9[3] ("the [SEC] pointed out that an investor's evaluation of
management is an important part of any investment decision . Thus, facts that would be likely to
indicate a possible change of management would be material to the reasonable investor").
I 11. Disclosure of information generally related to management integrity seldom results from a
broad appreciation of the importance of non-identifiable factors. Often disclosure of information
bearing on management integrity is specifically requires by SEC regulations. For example, the issue
arises in the context of disclosure of all material transactions between the issuer, its affiliates, and
management under Schedule A item 14; Form S-I item 17 and Form S-2 item 12. HAZEN, supra note
65 at § 3.9[3] (discussing the In re Franchard fact pattern).
1 12. In re Franchard, 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964)
1 13. Redwood, supra note 13, at 338 (describing In re Franchard as the SEC's "first foray" into the
materiality of management integrity).
1 14. In re Franchard, 42 S.E.C. at 168 -170.
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that "[t]he integrity of management . . . is always a material factor."" 5
Implicit in its determination was the idea that "quantitative" materiality,
accounting, was not enough."' Congress agreed, and in 1968, the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce released a report that
asserted, "The competence and integrity of a company's management, and
of the persons who seek management positions, are of vital importance to
stockholders."" 7 Nevertheless, In re Franchard turned out to be more of
the exception than the rule in the 1960s, and disclosure pursuant to the
securities laws continued to have a fairly narrow, quantitative focus,'18 until
the 1970s. In the wake of the Watergate scandal," 9 the SEC, under
Director of the Division of Enforcement Stanley Sporkin, embarked on an
ad hoc program requiring companies to disclose information specifically
relating to the competence and integrity of corporate managers, regardless
of whether such information would otherwise have been subject to
disclosure.' 20
In a March 1974 release, the SEC articulated an expansive idea of
what must be disclosed to investors by announcing additional disclosure
requirements regarding illegal campaign contributions and suggesting that
both adjudicated and unadjudicated' 2 ' illegal acts that reflected on
management's competence and integrity might be disclosed.'22 The SEC
wrote:
In the Division's view, the conviction of a corporation and/or its officers
or directors for having made illegal campaign contributions in violation
of 18 U.S.C. Section 610 is a material fact that should be disclosed to the
public and specifically to shareholders. . .. Such a conviction is material
to an evaluation of the integrity of the management of the corporation as
115. In re Franchard, 425S.E.C. at 172.
116. Caroline Antonacci, Note, SAB 99: Combating Earnings Management with a Qualitative
Standard ofMateriality, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 75, 81-82 (2001).
117. H.R. REP. No. 90-1711, pt. 1, at 2 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2812
("Secrecy in this area is inconsistent with the expectations of the people who invest in the securities of
publicly held corporations and impairs public confidence in securities as a medium of investment.").
118. John M. Fedders, Qualitative Materiality: The Birth, Struggles, and Demise of an Unworkable
Standard, 48 CATH. U. L. REv. 41, 46 (1998) (arguing against qualitative materiality). See also
Williams, supra note 13, at 1246-47 (dating efforts to use the federal securities laws to promote
expanded social disclosure from the late 1960s anti-war and environmental movements).
119. Watergate has been termed the "Dawn of a Qualitative Materiality Standard." Fedders, supra
note 118, at 49. This era has been described as a "maelstrom of moral outrage at the political and
corporate abuses." H. Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 50 BAYLOR L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1998) (discussion of the political environment at the time the FCPA
was adopted).
120. Redwood, supra note 13, at 316.
121. The disclosure of unadjudicated illegal acts remains controversial.
122. Division of Corporation Finance's Views and Comments on Disclosures relating to the Making
of Illegal Campaign Contributions by Public Companies and/or Their Officers and Directors, Securities
Act Release No. 5466, Exchange Act Release No. 10673, Investment Company Act Release No. 18315,
Release No. IC-8265 (Mar. 8, 1974), at 1-2, available at http://content.lawyerlinks.com/default.htm#
http://content.1awyerlinks.comlibrary/sec/sec releases/33-5466.htm.
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it relates to the operation of the corporation and the use of corporate
funds.123
In a 1975 release, the SEC counseled against using its authority for the
"promotion of social goals unrelated to the Federal securities law," but
noted that "in specified cases some information of this type might . . . be
required in order to make the statements in a filing not misleading or to
make the filing otherwise complete with respect to information investors
appropriately might need to make informed investment or voting
decisions."' 24 Commissioner A.A. Sommer, Jr., cautioned against "The
Slippery Slope of Materiality," but extolled the fact that "the value of the
concept of materiality derives from its very breadth, imprecision and
defiance of exact definition. It reflects the complexity of human affairs, the
multitude of situations in which human beings find themselves involved
and the multiplicity of relationships that they create."1 25
As part of its efforts to expose and reduce corruption in the mid 1970s,
the SEC also conducted a far-reaching investigation into questionable and
illegal payments by corporations. In 1976 the SEC issued a report to
Congress describing the results of an SEC program pursuant to which more
than 400 companies had admitted making improper or illegal payments
overseas. 126  Although these payments did not always have an immediate
123. Division of Corporation Finance's Views, supra note 122 (emphasis added). Director Sporkin
supported using In re Franchard's doctrine of materiality to encourage additional disclosure relating to
management integrity and competence. Redwood, supra note 13, at 340-41.
124. Conclusions and Proposals Re Environmental and Social Disclosure, Securities Act Release
No. 5627 (Oct. 14, 1975), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/digest/1975/diglOl575.pdf.
Regarding possible disclosure of corporate behavior in socially significant areas other than
the environment, the Commission concluded that no showing was made in this proceeding,
particularly in light of the more than 100 areas of social information identified by persons
responding to our request for comments, that disclosure of information describing corporate
social practices should be specifically required of all registrants. This is not to say,
however, that, in specified cases, some information of this type might not be required in
order to make the statements in a filing not misleading or to make the filing otherwise
complete with respect to information investors appropriately might need to make informed
investment or voting decisions. The Commission's rules already require, in addition to
specific disclosures, the disclosure of any other material information. Id.
125. A.A. Sommer, Jr., Commissioner, Address to the Practising Law Institute: The Slippery Slope
of Materiality, remarks delivered at 1-2 (Dec. 8, 1975), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
1975/120875sommer.pdf. Commissioner Sommer claimed that "[d]espite a constant yearning for
greater precision and certainty, the statutes administered by the Commission and the rules which the
Commission has adopted under them clearly evidence the Congressional and Commission conclusion
that precise rules simply cannot be framed to embrace every situation.' Id at 4. Nevertheless,
Commissioner Sommer warned against the "temptation" of a "hasty expansion of materiality" that
would impair the SE"s ability to perform its traditional role of policing the disclosure system and the
securities markets. Id.
126. SEC. & FxCH. COMM'N, 94TH CONG., REPORT ON QiUESTIONAILE AND IIGFAL CORPORATE
PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (Comm. Print 1976). The companies included 117 prestigious Fortune 500
comparnes, in a variety of industries, and the amouni of bribery involved was estimated to exceed $300




quantitative impact, i.e., they did not "directly relate to bottom-line
earnings, assets, revenues or liabilities of a corporation," 27 the SEC
nevertheless took the position that companies were required to disclose
such payments.128
In 1977, Congress enacted the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act1 29 to
prohibit foreign bribery and require issuers to maintain accurate books and
records. The report noted that "even if questionable or illegal payments are
not quantitatively material, disclosure of such payments may be required
because of their bearing on management's competency or integrity,"' 30 thus
recognizing that disclosure should accommodate more than just financial
matters. 131
Despite the TSC Industries decision and the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, the late 1970s were a period of retrenchment with respect to disclosure
related to management integrity. In 1978, the SEC, still under SEC
Enforcement Director Stanley Sporkin, began an investigation into
management integrity in the context of certain foreign currency
transactions undertaken by Citicorp. The SEC staff recommended'32 taking
administrative action against Citicorp for failing to disclose the risks of the
transactions in its periodic reports.' 33 However, the Commissioners
eventually voted1 34 not to take enforcement action, stating that because
Citicorp had never affirmatively stated that its directors had "honesty and
integrity," a departure from those standards did not have to be disclosed.135
After the staff recommendation and the Commissioners' decision were
leaked to the New York Times,136 Congress held hearings about the decision
not to bring a case against Citicorp, and accused the SEC of "overturn[ing]
long-established precedents and introduce[ing] new criteria for
127. Redwood, supra note 13, at 316-17.
128. Id. at 340.
129. Pub. L. No. 95-213 tit. 1, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (amending Sec. 13(b) of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C.A. Sec. 78m(b)). For a more comprehensive discussion of the provisions of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, see Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly
Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. R. (forthcoming Winter 2010-2011).
130. Ferrara et al., supra note 71 at 581.
131. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 126, at 19. Of course, the SEC also gave out some mixed
signals. See ADVISORY COMM., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE
TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION XV (1977) (in which the SEC rejected the idea of
administering the securities laws to ensure that the mandatory disclosure contained all the information
necessary for sound decision making, and opted not to expand the types of information required in
filings and prospectuses).
132. Other descriptions describe the staff position as "conflicting." Fedders, supra note 118 at 43.
133. SEC and Citicorp Hearings: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of
the Comm. on Energy and Commerce of the United States, 97th Cong. 285 (1982).
134. The vote was 3-1. Fedders, supra note 118, at 71.
135. SEC and Citicorp Hearings, supra note 133, at 304.
136. Fedders, supra note 118, at 71 (describing "pandemonium" in the media as the public
questioned the SEC's commitment to enforcement and disclosure).
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disclosure"13 7 when it decided not to enforce disclosure of information
relating to management integrity.
By the 1980s, the SEC was split1 38 about whether to require expanded
disclosure of non-financial information, and it had significantly backed
away from mandatory disclosure of management integrity or other
"qualitative" concerns.139  In 1982, SEC Director of Enforcement John
Fedders (Mr. Sporkin's successor) famously dismissed qualitative
materiality and stated that, with certain limited exceptions, the SEC
"should [only] begin enforcement actions where failure to disclose
unlawful conduct violates traditional quantitative standards of
materiality."140
In 1986, in United States v. Matthews, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that, under the proxy statement rules, a corporation
was not required to disclose unadjudicated illegal conduct of an executive
seeking election as a director."' The court ruled that, without a specific
SEC disclosure requirement, nondisclosure of uncharged criminal conduct
cannot be a criminal violation.142  The decision has been described by
former securities law regulators as "ANOTHER Drubbing of the
Qualitative Standard"' 43 and the decision which "definitely interred"44 the
qualitative materiality doctrine.145
137. SEC and Citicorp Hearings, supra note 135, at 1-2 (statement of Rep. John Dingell, Chairman,
Subcomm. On Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. On Energy and Commerce).
138. Commissioner Evans delivered a talk promoting the disclosure of management integrity. John
R. Evans, Comm'r, Address to the New York Chapter of Brigham Young University Management
Society: Thoughts on Business Ethics in a Private Enterprise System at 5 (Jun. 21, 1982), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1982/062182evans.pdf. Commissioner Longstreth stated that the SEC
needed to refine its views. Bevis Longstreth, SEC Disclosure Policy Regarding Management Integrity,
38 Bus. LAW. 1413, 1413-14 (1983) (remarks delivered at the Investor Responsibility Research Center
in New York City discussing the importance of economic materiality).
139. For example, the 1980 U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois decision in SEC
v. Chicago Helicopter Industries also rejected a qualitative materiality standard when it refused to
mandate disclosure of unadjudicated criminal behavior. SEC v. Chicago Helicopter Indus., No. 79-C-
0469, 1980 U.S. Dist LEXIS 17214, at *5, *7-9 (N.D. Ill, Jan. 18, 1980).
140. John M. Fedders, Speech, Failure to Disclose Illegal Conduct, 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
2057 (Nov. 26, 1982) ("[T]he Commission generally should not utilize the antifraud [sic] provisions of
the securities laws where there is a failure to disclose conduct which may be considered
qualitatively material.").
141. United States v. Matthews, 787 F.2d 38, 49 (2d Cir. 1986).
142. Id. The Matthews decision was thought by some at the time to have disposed of qualitative
materiality. Redwood, supra note 13, at 354-56.
143. Fedders, supra note 118, at 79 (emphasis in original).
144. Redwood, supra note 13, at 319.
145. See U.S. v. Crop Growers for a similar holding: the SEC charged three defendants with failure
to disclose uncharged criminal conduct relating to illegal campaign contributions, but the court
dismissed the charges. United States v. Crop Growers Corp., 954 F. Supp. 335, 340, 359 (D.D.C.
1997). This comports with United States v. Matthews. See Matthews, 787 F.2d at 49. ("[S]o long as
uncharged criminal conduct is not required to be disclosed by any rule lawfully promulgated by the
SEC, nondisclosure of such conduct cannot be the basis of a criminal prosecution.")
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b. The Current Regime: Specific Disclosure Relating to Management
Integrity Required by Reg S-K
Notwithstanding the debate over whether issues of management
integrity and competence are of vital interest to the "reasonable
shareholder," 4 6 and therefore material, 14 7 a great deal of information related
to management integrity must be disclosed under Reg S-K.148 For example,
Reg S-K requires that corporate officials report self-dealing transactions
and conflicts of interest with their employer,149 and whether they have been
the subject of any criminal charges or convictions or of any civil judgments
involving violations of the federal securities laws.'s Court review of
disclosures bearing on the integrity of management has generally recognize
that Reg S-K disclosure mandates are not the full extent of required
disclosure in this realm, but also fail to articulate any additional
information that should be disclosed on a simply material basis. 5
5. Environmental Information and Climate Change
a. Corporate Environmental Disclosure
Another issue of importance to a broad spectrum of investors that has
tested the limits of the SEC's interpretation of materiality has been
corporate environmental disclosure, 152 particularly the recent developments
in disclosure related to climate change risks. Significant efforts to persuade
the SEC to recognize the importance of environmental information date
back to the early 1970s. With federal environmental legislation such as the
146. Redwood, supra note 13, at 319-320 (urging the SEC to adopt a line item requiring the
disclosure of unadjudicated business crimes committed by director-candidates).
147. But management integrity may be a place where a materiality standard is hardest to use. It is
the disclosure of information about themselves that executives are confronting. In many cases, the
decision may be "highly stressful" or "emotionally charged." Joan MacLeod Heminway, Personal
Facts about Executive Officers: A Proposal for Tailored Disclosures to Encourage Reasonable Investor
Behavior, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 749, 767 (2007) (discussing the disclosure of personal information
by executive officers and how current materiality analysis fails in that context). With the corporation
and its executives unable to make a materiality analysis (qualitative or quantitative) the objective line
item disclosures from Reg S-K are likely to be all that is made.
148. HAZEN, supra note 65, § 3.9[3], at 142-43 (identifying the Reg S-K sections).
149. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.404.
150. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.401.
151. Abril & Olazabal, supra note 66, at 1593, 1605 (pointing to, for example, Maldonado v. Flynn,
597 F.2d 789,792-93 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Yeaman, 987 F. Supp. 373, 378 (E.D. Pa. 1997);
HAZEN, supra note 65, at 143 (discussing the difficulties in determining the materiality of disclosures
relating to the personal aspects of the lives and dealings of key personnel).
152. Questions regarding disclosure of environmental information in general, e.g., issues relating to
environmental law compliance, environmental management systems or waste treatment and recycling,
have been before the SEC for decades. Li-Mien Lin, Corporate Social and Environmental Disclosure in
Emerging Securities Markets, 35 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1, 3 (2009).
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National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)'53 and rapidly expanding
public awareness of environmental issues, companies subject to the federal
securities laws began to consider whether and how they should disclose
these new potential liabilities in their required periodic disclosure.154
In 1971, the National Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC)
submitted a rulemaking petition seeking expanded civil rights and
environmental disclosure under the federal securities laws.' Specifically,
the NRDC requested that the SEC require reporting companies to disclose
the environmental impact of their products and any steps taken to mitigate
that impact.15 The SEC refused, and after two administrative proceedings,
weeks of public hearings, hundreds of public comments, a record of more
than 10,000 pages,'5 7 two federal district court proceedings, and a trip to the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the result was little or no change in the SEC
disclosure rules.158
153. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970). Under NEPA,
all administrative agencies, including the SEC, are required to assess the impact of their actions on the
environment. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). See also Robert V.
Percival, 'Greening' the Constitution Harmonizing Environmental and Constitutional Values, 32
ENVTL. L. 809, 829 (2002).
154. Mark Latham, Environmental Liabilities and the Federal Securities Laws: A Proposal for
Improved Disclosure of Climate Change-Related Risks, 39 ENVTL. L. 647, 679 (2009). The SI'C'
provided some guidance in a 1971 release, Disclosures Pertaining to Matters Involving the Environment
and Civil Rights, which instructed reporting companies to disclose material costs of compliance with
environmental laws, as well as any (material or nonmaterial) pending or threatened environmental
litigation. Disclosures Pertaining to Matters Involving the Environment and Civil Rights, Securities Act
Release No. 5170, Exchange Act Release No. 9252, [1971 Transfer Binder] Fed Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
78,150, at 80,488 (July 19, 1971). See also Latham, supra, at 680 (speculating about why a materiality
requirement was not included with respect to environmental litigation). The SEC's 1971 release
effectively broadened required disclosure requirements for compliance costs (to include future costs)
and for litigation, since the SEC stated that any pending or threatened environmental litigation initiated
by governmental authorities "shall be deemed material and shall be described whether or not the
amount of any claim for damages involved exceeds 10 percent of current assets . . . and whether or not
such proceedings are considered 'ordinary routine litigation incidental to the business.'" Notice of
Adoption of Amendments to Registration and Report Forms to Require Disclosure with Respect to
Compliance with Environmental Requirements and Other Matters, Securities Act Release No. 5386,
Exchange Act Release No. 10,116, 1 SEC Docket 1, 2-3 (Apr. 20, 1973) (superseding the 1971
release). The need to disclose pending or threatened private environmental litigation would still be
subject to the materiality standard, with the proviso that if a company elected to omit information
relating to environmental litigation as nonmaterial, then the SEC Division of Corporation Finance
would follow up with the company regarding the information and the justification for its omission.
Elizabeth Ann Glass Geltman, Disclosure of Contingent Environmental Liabilities by Public
Companies under the Federal Securities Laws, 16 HARV. ENVTL L. REv. 129, 152 (1992).
155. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC (NRDC 1), 389 F. Supp. 689, 69394 (D.D.C.
1974).
156. Id. at 69394.
157 Notice of Commission Conclusions and Rulemaking Proposals in the Public Proceeding
Announced in Securities Act Release No. 5569, Securities Act Release No. 5627, Exchange Act
Release No. 1 1,733, 8 SEC Docket 41, 42 (Oct. 14, 1975).
I158. In National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC (NRDC I1), the D.C. District Court
reviewed the SEC's decision not to require significant additional environmental and civil rights
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Although the NRDC cases ultimately upheld the SEC's rejection of an
expanded understanding of materiality, the cases affirmatively established
that the SEC's statutory authority to require disclosure is broad.'
Disclosure of corporate environmental information could be material, but
in the 1970s it was not yet deemed important enough to investors to meet
the standard. The rejection of expanded environmental and civil rights
disclosure was based more on a failure to establish significant "ethical
investor" interest than on a finding that such disclosure could not be
material.'
Over the years, however, the SEC added an assortment of line-item
environmental disclosure requirements through its instructions to periodic
disclosure forms and guidance documents.' 6' These requirements were
organized and rationalized with the promulgation of Reg S-K,'6 2 and,
currently, material corporate environmental information is disclosed in
response to the requirements of Item 101 (Description of Business),163 Item
103 (Legal Proceedings)164 and Item 303 (Management's Discussion and
disclosure and remanded to the SEC. 389 F. Supp. at 700 (D.D.C. 1974). The Court noted that the
SEC's statutory authority to require disclosure is broad, and ruled that if the SEC was not going to
require disclosure of the information being sought by investors, it needed to determine that the
information was not material within the meaning of the securities laws. Id. The Court remanded on
administrative procedure grounds and the SEC went through new proceedings largely devoted to
developing a more complete factual record. Notice of Commission Conclusions and Rulemaking
Proposals in the Public Proceeding Announced in Securities Act Release No. 5569, Securities Act
Release No. 5627, Exchange Act Release No. 11,733, 8 SEC Docket 41, 47 (Oct. 14, 1975). Then,
while recognizing its broad discretion to require disclosure, the SEC decided that it would only require
dissemination of economically significant information. Again the D.C. District Court reviewed the
SEC decision (NRDC II) and remanded. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., v. SEC (NRDC II),
432 F. Supp. 1190 (D.D.C. 1977). However, on appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the SEC
prevailed and the Court upheld the SEC's existing disclosure rule as "adequate" given the low level of
investor interest in the issues (environment and civil rights) raised by the petition. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC (NRDC III), 606 F.2d 1031, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
159. Williams, supra note 13, at 1246-52.
160. Id. As one commentator has argued, "The conclusion. . . that the [SEC] does indeed possess
the power to enact rules solely in the public interest need not be limited to disclosures for the protection
of the environment, but lends itself naturally to extension to other forms of qualitative disclosure."
Redwood, supra note 13, at 330-31.
161. William W. Barker, SEC Registration of Public Offerings under the Securities Act of 1933, 52
BUS. LAW. 65, 82 (1996).
162. In addition, Regulation S-X and a variety of accounting bulletins have dealt with
environmental disclosure. See Latham, supra note 154, at 685-97.
163. Reg S-K requires the disclosure of environmental compliance costs in Item 101: "[T]he
material effects that compliance with Federal, State and local [environmental] provisions . .. may have
upon the capital expenditures, earnings and competitive position of the [company] and. . . any material
capital expenditures for environmental control facilities for the remainder of its current fiscal year and
its succeeding fiscal year and for such periods as the registrant may deem materials [sic]." Item
101(c)(1)(xii), 17 C.F.R. Sec. 229.101(c)(1)(xii). Many of the Item 101 factors are disclosed if
material.
I 64. Item 103 requires companies to disclose material pending legal proceedings other than
ordinary routine litigation incidental to the company's business. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103. Instruction 5
states that litigation under any environmental provisions will not be considered "ordinary routine
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Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations).' 5
b. The Challenge of Climate Change Reporting
i. Investor Interest
By the mid-2000s environmental concerns, in the context of climate
change, loomed large in popular consciousness.166 Scientific studies' 7 and
international initiatives'168 abounded. In 2007, the documentary film An
Inconvenient Truth won an Academy Award, and the Nobel Prize in Peace
was awarded jointly to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) and Albert Arnold (Al) Gore Jr. "for their efforts to build up and
litigation incidental to the business" and therefore must be disclosed: (1) if the litigation is material to
the company's business or financial condition; (2) if the value of the claim in the proceeding is more
than 10 percent of the current assets of the company and its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis; or (3)
if a governmental authority is party to the proceedings and they involve potential monetary sanctions of
more than $100,000. Although $100,000 in potential liability is clearly not "material" to most large
companies, the relatively low "threshold reflects the SEC's long-held view that environmental
performance is significant enough to investors to merit close scrutiny." Jeffrey A. Smith, Disclosure of
Climate Change Risks and Opportunities, 1664 PLI/CORP 149, 154 (2008).
165. Item 303, Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations, likely provides the broadest mandate for environmental disclosure. Kathryn Douglass,
Note and Comment, Add One to the Arsenal: Corporate Securities Laws in the Fight to Slow Global
Warming, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1119, 1130 (2009). Item 303 asks companies to give investors a
look at the company through the eyes of management and requires disclosure of "known trends, events
or uncertainties that are reasonably" expected to have material effects. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303. Concept
Release on Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Operations, Exchange
Act Release No. 6211, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,715 (proposed Apr. 24, 1987) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 229).
Other SEC guidance has also required management to discuss environmental liabilities specifically.
Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, 54 Fed. Reg.
22,427, 22,427 (proposed May 24, 1989) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, 241, and 271).
Item 503(c) may also trigger environmental disclosure by requiring a company to identify the most
significant risks that attend ownership of the company s securities. 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c). Despite its
potential application, the Risk Factors sections are not widely used for environmental disclosure.
Jeffrey M. McFarland, Warming Up to Climate Change Risk Disclosure, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.
L. 281, 289 (2009).
166. McFarland, supra note 165, at 281-83 (noting coverage of climate change in the New York
Times and on public radio, and describing it as a "daily topic of conversation").
167. E.g., NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW
(Cambridge University Press, 2006); MATTHIAS RUTH ET AL., THE US ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE COSTS OF INACTION: A REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT BY THE CENTER FOR
INTEGRATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH (CIER) AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND (October
2007), available at http://www.cier.umd.edu/documents (click on US Economic Impacts);
INTERACADEMY COUNCIL, LIGHTING THE WAY: TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE ENERGY FUTURE (October
2007), available at http://www.interacademycouncil.net/CMS/Reports/I11840.aspx.
168. For example, the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change; the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme. The Climate Change Petition cited an
increasing number of foreign nations that were issuing specific guidance on climate risk disclosure.
Petition for Interpretive Guidance on Climate Risk Disclosure, SEC file no. 4-547 (filed 2007)




disseminate greater knowledge about man-made climate change, and to lay
the foundations for the measures that are needed to counteract such
change."169  Congress introduced the America's Climate Security Act of
2007 to direct the Environmental Protection Agency to address greenhouse
gas emissions.' 70 The issue was debated in the 2008 Presidential campaign,
and Barack Obama's successful campaign platform included a "cap and
trade" policy. Meanwhile, several state attorneys general, most notably
Andrew Cuomo in New York, were also enforcing corporate disclosure
requirements.1
Nonetheless, and even though the securities laws have elicited
disclosure of general environmental liabilities, reporting on the cost of
climate change risk management measures was slim,172 and reporting of
climate change impacts almost nonexistent. 173
Both retail and institutional investors recognized the importance of
climate change. The major investment banks produced dozens of research
studies,174  shareholders sponsored numerous corporate resolutions, 75
climate-related investment advisory services developed at many large
brokers and investment advisors,7 6 and, in the absence of accessible,
169. The Nobel Peace Prize 2007, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/peace/
laureates/2007/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
170. America's Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007).
171. See, e.g., Xcel to Disclose Climate Risks, ENVIRONMENTAL LEADER (Aug. 28, 2008),
http://www.environmentalleader.com/2008/08/28/xcel-to-disclose-climate-risks; John Horan, Dynegy
Inc. Agrees with New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo to Disclose Material Risks Related to
Climate Change, GLOBAL CLIMATE LAW BLOG (Oct. 27, 2008), http://www.globalclimatelaw.com/
2008/1 0/articles/securities-disclosure/dynegy-inc-agrees-with-new-york-attomey-general-andrew-
cuomo-to-disclose-material-risks-related-to-climate-change.
172. Perry E. Wallace, Climate Change, Fiduciary Duty, and Corporate Disclosure: Are Things
Heating Up in the Boardroom?, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 293, 302 (2008). In the late 1990s an EPA study
found that 74 percent of reporting companies did not comply with SEC reporting rules with respect to
environmental regulations. Donald Sutherland, EPA Reveals U.S. Publicly Traded Corporations Hide
Billions in Environmental Debt, RISKWORLD (Apr. 9, 2002), http://www.riskworld.com/news/02q2/
nw02a096.htm.
173. In 2004, the Government Accountability Office released a report about environmental
disclosure, in which the SEC was quoted as stating that "disclosures about the impact of potential
greenhouse gas controls are not necessarily required at this time, according to officials at SEC's
Division of Corporation Finance, because controls do not appear imminent at the federal level through
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol . . " U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-808,
ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE: SEC SHOULD EXPLORE WAYS TO IMPROVE TRACKING AND
TRANSPARENCY OF INFORMATION 20-21 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d04808.pdf. However, the need for such disclosures was not ruled out.
174. See Climate Change Petition, supra note 168, at 35-37 (listing twenty one illustrative titles).
175. See INVESTOR NETWORK ON CLIMATE RISK, 2010 PROXY SEASON - RESOLUTION TRACKER
(July 19, 2010), available at http://www.ceres.org/Document.Doc?id=561 (citing a record number of
climate change proxy resolutions in 2010). See also Elise N. Rindfleisch, Shareholder Proposals: A
Catalyst for Climate Change-Related Disclosure, Analysis, and Action?, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 45, 48
(2008) (noting that in 2007 shareholders filed forty-three climate change-related proposals).
176. E.g., Sustainable Business Solutions and Climate Change, PWC.COM, http://www.pwc.com/ius/
en/corporate-sustainability-climate-change; Environmental Policy, JPMOROAN.COM, http://www.jp
39Winter 2011
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
required disclosure under the securities laws, an industry of private
information services developed. Trillions of dollars were invested in
climate-friendly funds.17 7
In addition, climate change became the focus of numerous NGOs,'17
including CERES,179 the Carbon Disclosure Project,'" and the Global
Reporting Initiative.'8 ' The NGOs lobbied for regulatory reform'82 and
proposed guidelines for disclosure when affecting the climate.' Many
companies began making voluntary climate disclosures,184 but without a
required, standardized mechanism, the disclosure was difficult to evaluate
comparatively."' The level of participation' and the completeness of
reports were variously described as "unsatisfying"18 7 and "inconsistent and
inadequate."' Such private efforts increased the amount of information
available to the public, but lacked the legitimacy and the authority to
compel participation that official government guidance provides.
morgan.com/pages/jpmc/community/env/policy/clim.
177. Climate Change Petition, supra note 168, at 37-38 (listing an assortment of market funds and
indices with climate or energy mandates).
178. Historically, the global environmental movement has benefited from the activities of such
organizations, and climate change disclosure has been no exception.
179. Ceres is a "network of investors, environmental organizations and other public interest groups
working with companies and investors to address sustainability challenges such as global climate
change." About Ceres, CERES, http://www.ceres.org/Page.aspx?pid=415 (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
180. The Carbon Disclosure Project is an independent organization that assembles a large database
of primary corporate climate change information. CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, http://www.cd
project.net (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
181. The Global Reporting Initiative is an international network of hundreds of organizations and
individuals, dedicated to creating conditions for the "transparent and reliable exchange of sustainability
information." About GRI, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, http://www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRI
(last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
182. Ceres and Calvert, an institutional investor, commissioned a report on climate change and risk
disclosure. CERES, INC., CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE BY THE S&P 500 (Jan. 2007), available at
https://www.cdproject.net/CDPResults/CDP4_S andP500_Report.pdf.
183. The Global Reporting Initiative developed G3 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines that
included environmental issues as well as a separate environmental protocol. G3 Guidelines, GLOBAL
REPORTING INITIATIVE, http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework/G3Guidelines. The
Carbon Disclosure Project created a reporting system for climate change data, Carbon Disclosure
Project, CDP5 Letter and Questionnaire, (Feb. 1, 2007) available at https://www.cdproject.net/
questionnaire.asp. However, the group reported difficulty in getting companies to publish their
disclosures on the Carbon Disclosure Project website. Carbon Disclosure Project FAQs, http://www.
cdproject.net/FAQs.asp.
184. Such disclosures "increased dramatically in volume, depth, detail, and sophistication" in the
mid-2000s. Smith, supra note 164, at 152.
185. Id. (warning that "[i]t would be a mistake, however, to believe that this voluntary activity, no
matter how sophisticated and well-intentioned, could become a permanent substitute for mandatory
reporting").
186. One survey of annual reports from 2001-2006 found an overall climate reporting rate of only
4900. Climate Change Petition, supra note 168, at 45-46.
187. McFarland, supra note 165, at 301 (noting as well that the number of registries and reporting
systems was inefficient for investors, especially given the technical nature of the data being produced).
I188. Climate Change Petition, supra note 168, at 47.
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ii. The Climate Change Petition
In September 2007, a group of 22 institutional investors, governmental
officials and environmental NGOs submitted a petition to the SEC
requesting interpretive guidance about reporting climate change issues
under the existing mandatory disclosure rules and regulations (the Climate
Change Petition).'" The Climate Change Petition asked the SEC to clarify
that material climate-related information must be included in corporate
disclosures under existing laws,190 and asserted that "the risks and
opportunities many corporations face in connection with climate change
fall squarely within the category of material information that is required to
be analyzed and disclosed in many corporate filings."191
In arguing for disclosure, the petition emphasized the financial impact
of climate risk, which it described as "material and subject to mandatory
disclosure under traditional principles of the securities laws and the
[SEC's] regulations." 92 The petition claimed that climate change risk
disclosure was "scant and inconsistent" and failed to satisfy investors' need
for information 93 because many companies took the position that risks
associated with climate change were too uncertain or remote to their
performance to meet the test of materiality. But, the petition argued, there
were now significant financial risks' 94 associated with climate change and
so "interest in climate risk is not limited to investors with a specific moral
or policy interest in climate change: it now covers an enormous range of
investors whose interest is purely financial."' 95
The Climate Change Petition sought recognition from the SEC that
climate change was material for many, if not most, companies, and that
climate change risks were important to investors. 9 6 The petition seemed to
ask the SEC to declare climate change risks important enough for
companies to evaluate, and then relied on existing securities laws to require
disclosure if the companies find material information in that evaluation.' 97
189. Climate Change Petition, supra note 168, at 15-18.
190. Id. at 2. It is important to note that this particular request seemed to ask for almost nothing -
simply that climate change should be disclosed if it is material.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 7.
193. Id.
194. The petition suggested that the SEC should clarify that companies may be obligated to make
disclosures relating to (1) "[pjhysical risks associated with climate change" that are material to the
company's operations or financial condition; (2) "[flinancial risks and opportunities associated with
present or probable greenhouse gas regulation;" and (3) [l]egal proceedings relating to climate change.
Id. at 53-56.
195. Id. at 7.
196. Id. at3 1314.
I197. Climate Change Petition, supra note 168, at 14-20.
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In many ways, by asking for the SEC to instruct companies to give
"close and well informed attention"1 98 to climate change risks and disclose
them if they are material, the Climate Change Petition simply asked the
SEC to declare that companies should do what the securities laws already
required them to do.' 9 9 The petition requested, "in addition to explaining
that climate risk merits careful scrutiny in companies' assessment of their
financial condition, the [SEC] should clarify that, under existing law,
registrants must disclose any and all material information related to climate
change."200
The Climate Change Petition characterized the existing SEC
disclosure regulations as "expansive" and "flexible," able to "reflect the
broad range of information investors consider when they assess corporate
value." 201' The Climate Change Petition walked through the provisions of
Reg S-K, and conducted an analysis using SAB 99, consistently making
arguments based on the financial impact of climate risk.202 In arguing for
the need for an interpretive release, the Climate Change Petition asserted:
"Assessment of whether the registrant faces material risks requiring public
disclosure does not impose any legal obligations beyond those long
required under the securities laws and the [SEC's] regulations and
guidance. The assessment of materiality of climate related risks is the same
process that registrants have undertaken with respect to other risks." 203
Overall, other than focusing the SEC's attention on climate change
disclosure, the Climate Change Petition sought no real changes in the law
that would increase requirements regarding the rate or quality of
reporting.204
Nevertheless, the SEC was slow to respond. In fact, while the SEC
considered the Climate Change Petition, Congress and the EPA continued
to strengthen climate change rules and the petition had to be updated
twice 205 to add, for example, the Energy Independence and Security Act of
198. Climate Change Petition, supra note 168, at 56.
199. McFarland, supra note 165, at 14 (warning that companies may therefore view SEC guidance
neutrally because it would "only rehash . . the companies' already-existing duties under the securities
laws").
200. Climate Change Petition, supra note 168, at 9 (emphasis added).
201. Id. at 13.
202. Id. at13-20.
203. Id. at 55. The petition went on to argue that "[t]hese are risks that responsible managers would
surely examine even in the absence of regulatory requirements: potential physical threats to assets and
regulatory and market developments that are likely to have material effects on the company's financial
condition and operations." Id.
204. McFarland, supra note 165, at 306 (pointing out that the same managers would be making the
same decisions using thc same securities laws).
205. Climate Risk Disclosure Petition Supplemental Filing 1, SF( tile no. 4-547 (filed June 12,
2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2008/petn4-547-supp.pdf; Climate Risk




20(7,206 the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008,207 Senate
Subcommittee hearings on climate risk disclosure,208 and an EPA final rule
requiring large sources of greenhouse gas emissions to report those
emissions annually.209 The EPA rulemaking, in particular, was described as
having "change[d] the landscape of climate risk disclosure, and [made] it
urgent that the [SEC] act to assure that emissions data and associated risks,
opportunities and management strategies are analyzed by corporations and
disclosed in SEC filings." 210
The pressure for the SEC to recognize the importance of climate
change to investors was overwhelming.211  As one commentator put it,
"clearly the tide has shifted with respect to global warming and other
environmental matters, which are no longer considered mere social
issues."2 12 At the start of 2010, the Social Investment Forum estimated that
professionally managed assets following sustainable and socially
responsible investing strategies accounted for approximately $3.07 trillion,
12 percent of the investment market.2 13
Even though information about a company's climate change impact
was important to many investors, it appears the financial effect of climate
change regulation and the actual effects of climate change pushed the SEC
into action. Given the EPA rulemaking, and the "unprecedented scope and
speed of change, and the market's appetite for information,"214 it was clear
that the SEC needed to clarify its disclosure expectations. However, SEC
action occurred only in the wake of decisive disclosure action by the EPA.
In the end, it took the SEC over two years to respond to the a petition for an
interpretive release that asked for no change to the existing standard.
206. Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (2007) (providing for increases in energy efficiency of
cars, appliances, and buildings).
207. Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844, div. F, tit. 11(2008)
(providing funds for the EPA to develop a rule "to require mandatory reporting of greenhouse gas
emissions above appropriate thresholds in all sectors of the economy"). The Act also included a
number of findings related to climate change. Id. at div F, tit IV, General Provisions, § 430(a).
208. Senate Subcommittee Hearing on Climate Risk Disclosure: Hearing before the Subcommittee
on Securities, Insurance, and Investment of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 110th Cong. 4-5 (2007).
209. Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gasses, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260, 50,267 (Oct. 30, 2009).
With this data, companies would be able to assess their exposure to climate change risk more precisely,
likely creating a "known trend" within the meaning of Reg S-K Item 303. Climate Risk Petition
Supplemental Filing 2, supra note 205, at 3.
210. Climate Risk Petition Supplemental Filing 2, supra note 205, at 3.
211. The SEC also received 24 comments on the petition. See Comments on Rulemaking Petition:
Request for Interpretive Guidance on Climate Risk Disclosure [File No. 4-547], SEC.GOV,
http://sec.gov/comments/4-547/4-547.shtml (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
212. McFarland, supra note 165, at 291 (emphasis added).
213. FOUNDATION 2010, REPORT ON SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING TRENDS IN THE UNITED
STATES 8 (2010), available at http://www.socialinvestorg/resources/pubs/documents/2O10TrendsES.pdf
(last visited Nov. 12, 2010).
214. Smith, supra note 164, at 153 (noting that the marketplace was demanding information).
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iii. The 2010 SEC Interpretive Release: The More Things Change..
The 2010 SEC interpretive release, Commission Guidance Regarding
Disclosure Related to Climate Change (the Climate Change Release), was
announced with extensive disclaimers. 15 SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro
was clear about the type of guidance being given: "An interpretive
release . . . does not create new legal requirements or modify existing ones-
it is merely intended to provide clarity and enhance consistency." 2 16 And,
in case such an ambitious agenda engendered hope in proponents of social
disclosure or greenhouse gas emissions limits, Chairman Schapiro went on:
The [SEC] is also not amending well-defined rules concerning public
company reporting obligations, nor redefining long-standing
interpretations of materiality. These rules and interpretations have
served investors well for decades, and provide both the framework and
flexibility necessary to apply to changing facts and circumstances. If
something has a material impact on a company then it is something that
needs to be disclosed - that has always been the case. 217
In short, the Climate Change Release simply provided interpretive
guidance on existing SEC disclosure requirements as they apply to business
or legal developments relating to climate change.2 18
The Climate Change Release recognized climate change as the topic
of "intense" public interest,219 and pointed to "international accords, federal
regulation, and state and local laws and regulations in the United States" 2 20
that address climate change. In analyzing the resulting reporting
requirements, the release affirmed the traditional TSC Industries and Basic
standards, particularly the TSC Industries instructions to the SEC to resolve
215. This may be related to the fact that the guidelines were approved in a 3-to-2 vote by the SEC,
which divided along party lines (Republican Commissioners Casey and Paredes voting against it). Jim
Efstathiou Jr., SEC Sets Corporate Climate-Change Disclosure Standard (Update 1), BLOOMBERG, Jan.
27, 2010, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aj7RlgI QkliQ.
216. Mary Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Statement before the Open Commission Meeting on
Disclosure Related to Business or Legislative Events on the Issue of Climate Change, (Jan. 27, 2010),
available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch01271 Omls-climate.htm.
2 17. Id.
218. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SI ('Issues Interpretive Guidance on Disclosure Related
to Business or Legal Developments Regarding Climate Change, (Jan. 27, 2010), available at
http://sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-15.htm.
219. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate
Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290 (Feb. 8, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. Parts 211, 231, 241) (citing "scientists,
government leaders, legislators, regulators and business, including insurance companies, investors,
analysts and the public at large"). Confronted with the breadth and scope of climate change issues, the
SEC then acknowledged the potential impact of climate change-related matters on public companies
and discussed the various voluntary and other regulatory sources of disclosure on which investors were
relying. Id. at 6290 92.
220. Id. at 6290 (including recent EPA measures).
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doubts in favor of requiring disclosure and thereby protecting investors. 22 1
The Climate Change Release reviewed the "most pertinent non-
financial statement disclosure rules that may require disclosure related to
climate change,"222 highlighting areas in which climate change might
trigger disclosure requirements under those provision, including, (1) the
impact of climate change-related legislation and regulation, if material; (2)
the impact of international accords and treaties, when material; (3) the
indirect consequences for companies from climate change-related
regulatory or business trends; and (4) the actual and potential material
physical impacts of climate change on a company's business. 2 3
Significantly, however, the Climate Change Release provided almost no
guidance about when climate change risks or opportunities may be
"material enough" to require disclosure.224
Thus, although the Climate Change Release raised the profile of
climate change impacts and risks, it did not represent an example of the
SEC requiring companies to disclosure information in response to investor
concerns that cannot presently be reliably quantified. It has long been true
that if environmental liabilities are financially material to a company then
they may need to be disclosed.225 In addition, thanks to increased investor
awareness, NGOs and voluntary disclosure pressure, and stronger EPA and
other administrative measures, there are now clear financial impacts on
companies from climate change regulation, and in many cases
demonstrable financial impacts from climate change itself The obligation
to disclose climate change information because of clear financial
(quantitatively material) reasons now settles the issue of materiality.226
221. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, supra note 219, at
6292-93 (citing TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 448). See supra note 88 and accompanying text for a
discussion of resolving doubts in favor of investor protection.
222. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, supra note 219, at
6293 (this would be Reg S-K Items 101, 103, 303 and 503(c)).
223. Id. at 6295-97.
224. See, e.g., Memorandum from Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP to Clients on New SEC Climate
Change Disclosure Obligations for All Filers (Feb. 10, 2010), available at http://www.willkie.com/
files/tbls29Publications%5CFileUpload5686%5C3229%5CNew%20SEC%20Climate%20Change%20
Disclosure%200bligations.pdf.
225. Disclosures Pertaining to Matters Involving the Environment and Civil Rights, Securities Act
Release No. 5170, Exchange Act Release No. 9252, [1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
78,150, at 80,4870 (July 19, 1971). It has long been argued that "because '[e]nvironmental liabilities
may have a material adverse effect on a company's balance sheet . under federal securities laws
disclosure is required on that basis alone.' Latham, supra note 154, at 678.
226. Nevertheless, there have been and continue to be a number of qualitative reasons - centered
around the importance of the environment in general and climate change in particular - for the
disclosure of corporate environmental information. For example, a company may report its
environmental accomplishments, its "green-ness" in order to attract or retain investors who value a
commitment to the environmental for policy reasons. See, e.g., Rindfleisch, supra note 175, at 48. Or,
a company may disclose information about its environmental record "to show that superior management
is at the helm of the business and has taken concrete stops to minimize adverse environmental impacts."
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III. IRAN
A. WHAT DOES IT TAKE?
What does it take for the securities laws to require disclosure of an
issue without a clear, direct financial impact? The debates surrounding
disclosure of management integrity issues and climate change risks provide
examples in which information was provided to investors once it was
required as a Reg S-K line item, or the issue had developed a clear financial
impact. In addition, disclosure requirements came in response to a
substantial amount of pressure from outside the SEC in the form of
legislative initiatives, NGO activism, investor interest, private disclosure
services and international measures. Reporting companies did not
recognize the materiality of the issues for disclosure purposes until the
sheer volume of investor concern and regulatory restrictions created
undeniably material financial consequences. This fact suggests that
although the SEC may pay lip service to the concept that materiality is a
broad doctrine, in practice SEC enforcement may be limited to financially
significant information that can be quantified at present.
The conclusion that the SEC is accepting reductive interpretations of
materiality and therefore not requiring complete disclosure of non-
financial, material information is borne out in the disclosure of companies'
business operations in Iran. A survey of reporting companies' responses to
SEC questions about the materiality of their Iranian activities, discussed
below in Part III.E.3, demonstrates that quantifiable, financial impact is the
dispositive factor in a materiality determination. The SEC does not say
"stop" until long after the car has backed into the curb.
B. INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS
The SEC's unwillingness to determine that information about a
company's operations in Iran is material to investors regardless of the
financial magnitude is surprising given Iran's human rights abuses, nuclear
ambitions, and support for global terrorism, and the resulting level of
international and U.S. censure. Between 2006 and 2008, the UN Security
Council passed Resolutions 1696,227 1737,228 1747229 and 1803,230 all of
Latham, supra note 154, at 678.
227. On July 31, 2006 the Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 1696 expressing
serious concern raised by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports on Iran's nuclear
program, requiring Iran to suspend all of its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities, and calling
on other countries to ban the transfer to Iran of all items which could contribute to the enrichment of
uranium. S.C. Res. 1696, 2-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006); see also Citing Iran's
Failure to Clarift Nuclear Ambitions, UN Imposes Additional Sanctions, UN NEWS SERVICE (June 9,
20 10), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp? NewslD= 34970& Criran& CrI .
228. On December 23, 2006, the Security Council passed Resolution 1737 which reiterated its
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which expressed concern about reports of Iran's nuclear program and
sought to slow or halt Iran's uranium enrichment activities. On June 9,
2010, Security Council Resolution 1929231 expanded the arms embargo and
tightened restrictions on certain financial and shipping activities.23 2
Resolution 1929 also included an annex with measures directed against 41
new named entities and individuals, including enterprises linked to the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard and the defense industry, as well as banks and
the Iranian national shipping line. 233  Resolution 1929 created a panel of
experts to monitor implementation23 4 and triggered additional national and
regional sanctions by UN member states.235
C. U.S. FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS
1. Federal Regulations
However, the most extensive sanctions on Iran have been imposed by
the United States. The U.S. Department of State has identified Iran as a
serious concern and again demanded that Iran suspend uranium enrichment, and required other
countries to take all necessary measures to prevent the supply of goods and technologies that could
contribute to Iran's uranium enrichment. S.C. Res. 1737, T 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23,
2006).
229. On March 24, 2007, the Security Council passed Resolution 1747, again emphasizing serious
concern about Iran's nuclear program and demanding that Iran halt its uranium enrichment and
reprocessing activities. S.C. Res. 1747, 1-10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007) (noting that
Iran had ignored Resolutions 1696 and 1737, Resolution 1747 called on other countries to expand their
restrictions on Iran).
230. On March 3, 2008, the Security Council passed Resolution 1803 reemphasizing its serious
concern and demanding Iran halt its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities and calling on
other countries to expand sanctions. S.C. Res. 1803, 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008).
231. Resolution 1929 had the support of 12 Security Council members. Brazil and Turkey voted
against it, and Lebanon abstained. Citing Iran 's Failure to Clarify Nuclear Ambitions, UN Imposes
Additional Sanctions, supra note 227.
232. SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, GLOBAL COMPLIANCE RISKS INCREASE -WITH EXPANDED
INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN 6 (2010), available at http://www.shearman.com/files/
Publication/d821167f-6197-4835-87c6-b2af88a0df9c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/93e675f5-
2d14-46b2-822b-365075 14bdl1 7/LT-071 210-Global-Compliance-Risks-Increase-with-Expanded-
International-Sanctions-Again.pdf (summarizing the main provisions of Resolution 1929).
233. Press Release, UN Department of Public Information, News and Media Division, Security
Council Imposes Additional Sanctions on Iran, Voting 12 in Favour to 2 Against, with 1 Abstention,
U.N. Doc. SC/9948 (June 9, 2010).
234. Id.
235. In July 2010, the European Union imposed sanctions on Iran including travel bans, asset
freezes, a ban on new trade finance, barring insurance services, barring cargo-only flights, and
prohibiting the supply of equipment and technology for oil and gas industries. David Crawford &
Stephen Fidler, EU Steps Up Iran Penalties but Also Lifts Some Curbs, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2010,
http:!/online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703700904575390830497692208.html?KEYWORDS
=iran (noting, however, that a concession was made with respect to the Bushehr plant in order to secure
Russian cooperation with international efforts on Iran).
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State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) since 1984.236 Countries designated as
SSTs are subject to a variety of financial and other restrictions including
denial of Export-Import Bank credits and other financing guarantees. 237
Iran has also been subject to restrictions promulgated by the U.S.
Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) for
over 30 years. The Iranian Assets Control Regulations were imposed in
1979 in response to the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran.238  The
current Iranian Transactions Regulations, 239 first put into place in 1987,
prohibit virtually all trade and investment activities with Iran 240 by U.S.
persons, defined as U.S. citizens and companies, and persons physically in
the United States. 24 1
236. State Sponsors oJ Terrorism, U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm (last
visited Oct. 17, 2010). Countries determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided
support for acts of international terrorism are designated pursuant to three laws: Section 6(j) of the
Export Administration Act of 1979, Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, and Section 620A of
the Foreign Assistance Act. Currently the Department of State has designated Cuba, Iran, Sudan and
Syria. Id.
237. Office of the Coordinator of Counterterrorism, State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, (Aug. 5, 2010), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/140889.htm. See also GARY CLYDE
HUFBAUER, JEFFREY J. SCHOTT & BARBARA OEGG, POLICY BRIEF 01-11: USING SANCTIONS TO FIGHT
TERRORISM (Nov. 2001), http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb.cfm?ResearchlD=79.
238. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 31 C.F.R. § 535 (2010). OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, WHAT You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: AN
OVERVIEW OF O.F.A.C. REGULATIONS INVOLVING SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN (Oct. 15, 2010),
available at http://treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/iran/iran.pdf The United States later
expanded the freeze into a full trade embargo, which was lifted when the Algiers Accords were signed
with Iran in 1981. Id. Many U.S. nationals still hold pre-1979 claims against Iran, however, so the
Iranian Asset Control Regulations remain in effect.
239. 31 C.F.R. pt. 560 (2010). The regulations were promulgated pursuant to President Reagan's
Executive Order 12613 on October 29, 1987, which found that the Government of Iran was actively
supporting terrorism as an instrument of state policy. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, supra
note 238, at 1.
240. See generally 31 CFR pt. 560. Technically such transactions are prohibited "unless licensed by
OFAC." OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, supra note 238, at 1. Under the regulations, goods,
technology, or services may not be exported, reexported, sold or supplied, directly or indirectly, from
the United States or by a U.S. person, wherever located, to Iran or the Government of Iran. In addition,
U.S. persons, including foreign branches of U.S. depository institutions and trading companies, are
prohibited from engaging in any transactions related to goods or services of Iranian origin or goods or
services owned or controlled by the Government of Iran. New investments by U.S. persons in Iran or in
property (including entities) owned or controlled by the Government of Iran are prohibited. While the
Iranian Transactions Regulations do not contain any blocking provisions, several Iranian banks have
been separately designated under the Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction ("NPWMD")
or Specially Designated Global Terrorist ("SDGT") programs for their involvement in the financing of
either WMD or ballistic missile proliferation or of terrorism, respectively. Finally, U.S. depository
institutions, including foreign branches. are prohibited from servicing accounts of the Government of
Iran, including banks owned or controlled by the Government of Iran or persons in Iran. Id. at 2.
241. The regulations apply to all "U.S. Persons," defined as 'any United States citizen, permanent
resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States (including foreign branches) or any
person in the United States." 31 C.F.R. § 560.3 14 (2010).
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U.S. economic sanctions against Iran have been steadily
strengthened,242 especially in recent years. For example, the regulations
were tightened in 2008 when authorization for so-called "U-turn" financial
transactions (transfers involving Iran that originate and end with non-
Iranian foreign banks) was revoked.243 In June 2010, OFAC tightened the
Iranian Transaction Regulations to include the expanded list of persons that
would come within the category of "the Government of Iran," 24 4 and in
September 2010 it removed general licenses that had authorized certain
exports and imports (for example, of foodstuffs and carpets). 245
In August 2010, OFAC promulgated the new Iranian Financial
Sanctions Regulations, 246  which implement provisions of the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of
2010 (discussed below) by prohibiting or imposing strict conditions on
U.S. correspondent accounts for foreign financial institutions that
knowingly facilitate Iran's acquisition of weapons of mass destruction or
support for international terrorism.247 The Iranian Financial Sanctions
Regulations thus apply to U.S. financial institutions.248 Appendix A of the
new regulations lists the foreign financial institutions with which dealings
are restricted.
One might assume that, since these measures prevent U.S. companies
from conducting business in Iran, then there is no risk that U.S. investors
could invest in companies that conduct business there. However, as noted
above, the OFAC regulations do not directly apply to foreign companies,
including foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies. The only restriction in
the regulations is that a U.S. person cannot approve, finance, facilitate or
guarantee a transaction with Iran by a foreign person (such as a foreign
subsidiary of a U.S. company) if the U.S. person cannot perform the
transaction directly.249 Thus, a U.S. investor may buy securities in a
242. The regulations were expanded under three subsequent Executive Orders by President Clinton.
Executive Order 12957 (Mar. 15, 1995) (prohibiting U.S. involvement with petroleum development in
Iran); Executive Order 12959 (May 6, 1995) (substantially tightening sanctions against Iran); Executive
Order 13059 (Aug. 19, 1997) (clarifying Executive Orders 12957 and 12959, and confirming that
virtually all trade and investment activities with Iran by U.S. personas are prohibited). However, the
2000 Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act eased sanctions slightly to allow U.S.
persons to purchase and import carpets and certain food products from Iran. Pub. L. No. 106-387, 114
Stat. 1549, 31 C.F.R. § 560.534 (2000) (repealed 2010).
243. Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control, 31 C.F.R. pt. 560, Iranian
Transactions Regulations Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 66,541, 66,541-42 (Nov. 10, 2008) (amending 31
C.F.R. § 560.405 and § 560.516).
244. 31 C.F.R. pt. 560, Appendix A To Part 560-Persons Determined To Be The Government Of
Iran, As Defined In § 560.304 Of This Part, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,630 (June 18, 2010).
245. 75 Fed. Reg. 59,612, 59,613 (Sept. 28, 2010) (amending 31 C.F.R. pt. 560 to remove and
reserve Sections 560.534 and 560.535).
246. 75 Fed. Reg. 49,836, 49,843 (Aug. 16, 2010) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 561).
247. 31 C.F.R. § 561 .201 (2010).
248. "U.S. financial institution" is defined in 31 C.F.R § 561.309.
249. 31 C.F.R. § 560.208 (prohibited facilitation by United States persons of transactions by foreign
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foreign company that does business in Iran, or in a U.S. company with a
subsidiary or an affiliate that does business in Iran.
2. Congressional Action Expands U.S. Sanctions
In 1996, the United States enacted what is now known as the Iran
Sanctions Act ("ISA").250 ISA prohibits investments25 1 of over $20 million
a year that directly and significantly contribute to the enhancement of
Iran's ability to explore for, extract, refine, or transport by pipeline its
petroleum and natural gas reserves, and instructs the President to impose
sanctions on any person that the President determines has made such an
investment. 252
U.S. companies were already prohibited from investing in Iran when
ISA was passed. Its primary targets are non-U.S. companies profiting from
the exploitation of the significant oil and natural gas resources in Iran.
Such investment is often not prohibited under the laws of those companies'
home countries. Historically, ISA has not been enforced by the United
States. As originally drafted, ISA allowed the President to waive
application of sanctions if he certified that doing so was important to the
U.S. national interest, and such waivers were granted to several non-U.S.
reporting companies. 253
persons) (". . . no United States person, wherever located, may approve, finance, facilitate, or guarantee
any transaction by a foreign person where the transaction by that foreign person would be prohibited by
this part if performed by a United States person or within the United States").
250. ISA was originally known as the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), Pub. L. No. 104-172,
110 Stat. 1541 (1996) (as codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006)), but in 2004 Libya yielded
to international pressure to give up the two intelligence agents suspected in the 1988 bombing of Pan
Am Flight 103, and both U.S. and UN sanctions were removed. ILSA was subsequently renamed ISA.
251. The definition of "investment" in ISA includes (i) entry into a contract on or after August 5,
1996, that (A) includes responsibility for development of petroleum resources located in Iran, (B)
provides for the general supervision and guarantee of performance of such a contract by another or (C)
provides for participation in royalties, earnings, or profits from such development, or (ii) the purchase
on or after August 5, 1996 of an ownership interest in such development. Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 14(9),
110 Stat. 1549-50 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (2006)). It also includes additions to
existing investment, as added by ILSA Extension Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-24, § 5, 115 Stat. 199,
200 (2001) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (2006)). Expressly excluded from the
definition of "investment" are the "entry into, performance, [and] financing of contracts to sell or
purchase goods, services, or technology." Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 14(9), 1I10 Stat. 1549 (1996)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (2006)).
252. The sanctions originally included in ISA were: (1) denial of Export-Import Bank loans, credits,
or credit guarantees for U.S. exports to the sanctioned entity; (2) denial of licenses for the U.S. export
of military or militarily-useful technology; (3) denial of U.S. bank loans exceeding $10 million in one
year; (4) if the entity is a financial institution, a prohibition on its service as a primary dealer in U.S.
government bonds; (5) if the entity is a financial institution, a prohibition on its serving as a repository
for U.S. government funds; (6) prohibition on U.S. government procurement from the entity; and (7)
restriction on imports from the entity, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. 1701 and following). Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 6, 110 Stat. 1545.
253. Id. at § 9(c) (for a waiver in the national interest). There are also several "exceptions' granting
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However, in July 2010, following the fourth round of UN sanctions,
Congress strengthened the ISA prohibitions254 by passing the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010
(CISADA). 255  CISADA added new potential sanctions to the ISA list;256
added insurance, financing and shipping as services that may contribute to
the enhancement of Iran's petroleum sector;257 imposed strict conditions on
foreign financial institutions that engage in business with Iran;2 5 8 restricted
Iran-related activities of subsidiaries of U.S. financial institutions;2 59
required companies that receive U.S. government contracts to cease
sanctionable activities;26 and provided procedures to restrict exports to
countries designated as likely to divert products to Iran.26 1 In addition, the
new legislation decreased the President's discretion to waive sanctions
under the ISA262 and encouraged state and local governments to divest from
companies and financial institutions doing business in Iran's energy
sector.2 63 CISADA is expected to lead to legal challenges and fines for a
number of non-U.S. reporting firms. 264
the President discretion not to impose sanctions, such as when sanctions would negatively affect the
procurement of defense articles or services essential to the national security. One such waiver was
granted by President Clinton for the 1997 investment by French company Total SA, along with Russia's
Gazprom and Malaysia's Petronas, in the South Pars gas field. See KENNETH IKTZMAN, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., IRAN SANCTIONS 6 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/
RS20871.pdf.
254. E.g., The Iran Sanctions Enabling Act, H.R. 1327, 11Ith Cong. (as passed by House, Oct. 14,
2009) (authorizing a state or local government to adopt and enforce measures to prohibit the investment
of its assets in Iran's energy sector, and to divest its assets from or prohibit the investment of assets it
controls in, persons who have investments of more than $20 million in Iran's energy sector); The Iran
Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act of 2009, H.R. 2194, 111th Cong. (as passed by House, Dec. 15, 2009)
(aiming to restrict gasoline supplies to Iran and strengthen ISA).
255. Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA), H.R.
2194, 111th Cong. (2010). For a good summary of CISADA, see SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP,
GLOBAL COMPLIANCE RISKS INCREASE WITH EXPANDED INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN 6
(2010), at 2-6, available at http://www.shearman.com/files/Publication/d821167f-6197-4835-87c6-
b2af88a0df9c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/93e675f5-2dl4-46b2-822b-36507514bdl7/LT-
071210-Global-Compliance-Risks-Increase-with-Expanded-International-Sanctions-Again.pdf
256. CISADA, H.R. 2194 § 102(a). CISADA changed the seven potential sanctions under the ISA
for investments in the petroleum sector slightly to add prohibitions of: (1) access to foreign exchange in
the United States; (2) access to the U.S. banking system; and (3) transactions in U.S. property, and to
remove the prohibition of a financial institution serving as a repository for U.S. government funds.
257. See id. § 102(a)(3)(B).
258. See id. § 104(c).
259. See id. § 104(d).
260. See id. § 106(a).
261. See id. § 303(a).
262. See id. § 401(b).
263. See id. § 202(a).
264. Jay Solomon, David Crawford & Mari Iwata, U.S. Adds fts Own Sanctions on Iran, WALL ST.
J., July 2, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703571704575341290619450352.
html?KEYWORDS iran (naming Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Inc., Sumitomo Mitsui Financial
Group and Mizuho Financial Group Inc., Commerzbank AG and Deutsche Bank AG as likely targets).
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During the 2000s, Congress passed several more measures to isolate
Iran. The 2000 Iran Nonproliferation Act provided for punitive action
against foreign persons who transfer goods, services, or technology to Iran
to aid in weapons of mass destruction programs. 265 The 2006 Iran Freedom
Support Act was signed into law "to hold the current regime in Iran
accountable for its threatening behavior." 266
Additionally, in July 2010, Representative Ted Deutch (D-FL)
introduced the Iran Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010 which
would require issuers to disclose whether they engaged in any activity that
is sanctionable under ISA, violated certain sections of CISADA or have
any ties to a company that the U.S. has designated as contributing to
Iranian proliferation activities. 267  Congressman Deutch explained, "[b]y
mandating self-disclosure and making this information available to the
public through SEC filings, we allow not just our government, but the
American people, the opportunity to ensure their investment dollars are not
actively undermining our national security priorities." 268
3. State Measures
In addition, over a dozen states - including Arizona, 269 California, 270
Florida,27 1  Georgia,272  IllinoiS,273  Indiana, 274  Louisiana,275  Michigan, 276
Minnesota, 277  Missouri,278  and New Jersey 279  - require their state
265. Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-178, 114 Stat. 38 (2000).
266. Iran Freedom Support Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-293, 120 Stat. 1344 (2006).
267. Iran Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010, H.R. 5833, 111th Cong. (2010). The bill
was referred to the Committee on Financial Services on July 22, 2010. The bill was introduced by
Congressman Deutch, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, along with Ranking Member
of the Foreign Affairs Committee Rep. Ileana Ros-Lebtinen (R-FL), Chairman of the Middle East
Subcommittee Rep. Gary Ackerman (D-NY), Rep. Ron Klein (D-FL), member of the Financial
Services and Foreign Affairs committees, and Rep. Dan Burton (R-IN) Ranking Member of the Middle
East Subcommittee.
268. Press Release, Ted Deutch for Congress, Congressman Deutch Introduces Legislation to
Strengthen Iran Sanctions, available at https://www.tedforcongress.com/news.asp?ItemID=328 (last
visited Oct. 21, 2010).
269. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-393 (West 2009).
270. California Public Divestment From Iran Act, CAL. GoV'T CODE § 7513.7 (West 2009).
271. FLA. STAT. § 215.473 (West 2009) (stature also bars companies from doing business in Sudan).
272. GA. CODE ANN. § 47-20-83.1 (West 2009).
273. 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-110.15 (West 2009).
274. IND. CODE § 5-10.2-10 (West 2009) (requiring divestment from Iran and Syria; the state had
passed similar legislation in 2007 with respect to Sudan).
275. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11:313 (West 2009)
276. MiCH. COMP. LAWS § 38.1133d (West 2009).
277. MINN. STAT. § I IA.244 (2009). The law requires the investment board to scrutminize its
holdings for companies actively doing business in Iran and to notify the businesses that they are subject
to divestment. After a ninety-day period, the law requires the board to start getting rid of its stock in
those companies. The law does not apply to humanitarian groups or companies authorized to do
business in Iran by the federal government. Id.
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investment boards, pension funds, or both to divest their assets from
companies that do business in Iran. State insurance departments have also
sought divestment by the companies that they regulate. For example, the
California Insurance Commissioner announced a Terrorist Financing Probe
in June 2009 to review compliance with a California law 280 that prohibits
insurers from investing in SSTs. 8  California insurance companies were
required to identify their direct investments in designated sectors of the
Iranian economy and their indirect investments in companies doing
business in those sectors. In December 2009, the California Insurance
Department announced that although insurers reported no direct
investments in Iran and therefore were in full compliance with state law, 282
the Department had uncovered billions of dollars of indirect investments in
companies doing business with the Iranian oil and natural gas, nuclear and
defense sectors. To put an end to those indirect investments, in February
2010 the Department announced that insurers' investments in 50 Iran-
related companies283 will not be recognized on the insurers' financial
statements in California.2 84 In May 2010, the California Insurance
Commissioner announced that 1,010 insurance companies - more than 75
percent of insurers licensed to do business in California - had agreed to
forgo future investments in the identified companies. 8  California
published its list of 50 Iran-related companies, and it published the names
of the companies that did not agree to the moratorium. 286
278. Mo. REV. STAT. § 30.953 (West 2009).
279. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:18A-89.12 (West 2009). New Jersey had prohibited its state pension
fund from making investments in companies doing business in Sudan in 2005. See Laura Craven,
Jersey Won't Invest in Companies Doing Business with Iran, NEWJERSEY.COM, Jan. 4, 2008,
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2008/0 1/jersey wont invest in companie.html (last visited Feb. 10,
2010).
280. CAL INS CODE § 1241.1 (West 2009).
281. Press Release, Cal. Dep't of Ins. Ins., Comm'r Steve Poizner Announces Terrorism Fin. Probe
(June 29, 2009), http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/0100-press-releases/0080-2009/nrl04-09.cfm.
282. Press Release, Cal. Dep't of Ins., Terror Financing Probe Results in Insurance Industry
Reporting $12 Billion in Investments Tied to Iran (Dec. 2, 2009), http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-
news/0100-press-releases/0080-2009/releasel183-09.cfm.
283. List of Companies Doing Business with the Iranian Petroleum/Natural Gas, Nuclear, and
Defense Sectors, CAL. DEP'T OF INS. (Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/0100-
press-releases/201 0/upload/IranListO21010.pdf,
284. Press Release, Cal. Dep't of Ins., Insurance Commissioner Poizner Protects California
Policyholders from Risky Iran-Related Investments (February 10, 2010), http://www.insurance.ca.gov/
0400-news/0100-press-releases/2010/release021-10.cfm.
285. Press Release, Cal. Dep't of Ins., Ins. Commissioner Poizner Announces More Than 1000
Insurers Agree to Voluntary Sanctions against Iranian Government (May 13, 2010), http://www.
insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/0I 00-press-releases/201 0/release066- 10.cfm.
286. Press Release, Cal. Dep't of Ins., Insurance Companies Licensed in California that Did Not
Agree to Voluntary Moratorium on Future Investments in 50 Identified Iran-related companies (May
12, 2010), http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/01 00-press-releases/20 10/upload/Declined
Moratorium.pdf (including MetLife, Safeco and Hartford).
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D. INVESTORS ARE SEEKING INFORMATION ABOUT IRANIAN OPERATIONS
BUT REPORTING COMPANY DISCLOSURE HAS BEEN POOR
1. Requests for Information
The California Insurance Department measures, particularly the public
identification of companies with Iran-related operations, illustrate an
important point: investors are looking for information about which
companies are doing business in Iran, and that information is not being
disclosed in companies' periodic reports. Numerous institutional investors
have requested that the SEC require disclosure of business operations in
SSTs. For example, in June 2005, representatives of fifty public employee
retirement systems, under strong pressure to divest from companies doing
business in Sudan, wrote to the SEC and the Departments of State,
Treasury, and Commerce and asked for "assistance in identifying any
publicly traded companies that are of concern to the United States
government for doing business with, or having business ties to, entities that
support terrorism or threaten U.S. humanitarian goals."287 The pension
funds stated that they needed information about these entities to "ensure
that [they were] not inadvertently acting in conflict with the foreign policy
and humanitarian goals of the United States, thereby subjecting [their]
members to excessive investment risk."288 A few days later, officials from
national organizations representing state auditors, state retirement
administrators, public employee retirement systems, state legislatures, and
teacher retirement funds wrote to the same four agencies asking them to
"[m]andate readily accessible disclosures" and to "[p]rovide a searchable,
publicly available database . . . of publicly held companies with material
business or operations in nations classified as supporting terrorism or
subject to sanctions."289
2. Reporting Company Disclosure Has Been Poor
To date, U.S. securities laws have not effectively been used to require
companies doing business in SSTs to disclose such business. U.S.
reporting companies with subsidiaries with operations in Iran, and non-U.S.
reporting companies with direct operations, have long and successfully
taken the position that their business in Iran is not material, and therefore
does not have to be disclosed, if it constitutes a financially insignificant
287. Letter from Gail Stone, Exec. Dir., Ark. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. et al., to E. Anthony Wayne,
Interim Under Sec'y for Econ., Bus. & Agric. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State et al I (June 3, 2005),
http://www.nasra.org/resources/terrorism/Joint% 20Sanctions% 2OLetter.pdf
288. Id. The pension funds pointed out that "existing laws require your agencies to identify,
monitor and sanction companies with business or financial ties to terrorist sponsoring countries." Id. at 2.
289. Id. at 1 2.
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percentage of the company's bottom line.290 Without disclosure, it is
difficult for investors to find out whether reporting companies have
operations in Iran.
A 2009 empirical database created by this author found that only 49
percent of a sampling of public companies with credibly reported
operations in three SSTs (Iran, Cuba and Sudan) included any disclosure of
those operations in their periodic reports.2 9' In addition, many of the
companies that disclosed the operations only did so in passing (e.g., by
using the word "Iran" in the name of a listed subsidiary). If such cursory
"disclosure" was factored out, only 36 percent of reporting companies with
business operations in the three SSTs were disclosing.29 2
3. Efforts to Fill the Disclosure Gap
In the absence of reliable official disclosure by companies in their
periodic reports, investors have been left to look for information from other
sources. Institutional investors often subscribe to private global security
risk assessment services such as Conflict Securities Advisory Group
(CSAG), 2 93 MCSI, 2 94 or World-Check. 2 95  World-Check, for example,
provides a database of known heightened risks to individuals and
businesses and claims that its subscribing customers include more than
3,000 institutions, including over 90 percent of the world's largest banks
and "200 enforcement and regulatory agencies."296
In addition to private, paid subscription services, NGOs have played a
key part in increasing disclosure about companies' investments in SSTs,
particularly in the case of Iran. United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), for
290. See, e.g., Letter from Frank B. Wyatt II, Gen. Counsel, CommScope, Inc., to Cecilia Blye,
Chief, Off. of Global Security Risk, SEC, Regarding 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31,
2008 (June 14, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1035884/0001193125101
38925/filenamel.htm; Letter from Thomas A. Connell, Vice Pres. and Controller, The Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., to Terence O'Brien, Branch Chief, Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC, Regarding Form 10-K for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2009 (June 9, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/42582/000095012310056937/filenamel.htm; Letter from Alex Vanselow, Chief Fin. Officer, BHP
Billiton Limited and BHP Billiton Plc, to Celilia D. Blye, Chief, Off. of Global Security Risk, SEC,
Regarding Form 20-F for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2009 (June 2, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/811809/000095017210000021/filenamel.htm.
291. Westbrook, supra note 5, at 1216.
292. Id. at 1217.
293. See About CSAG, CONFLICT SECURITIES ADVISORY GROUP (2010), http://www.conflict
securities.com/about/index.cfm (founded in the weeks after the September 1Ith attacks, CSAG is an
independent research provider that specializes in identifying and assessing publicly traded companies
that have business activities in or with countries on the U.S. State Department's list of SSTs).
294. Overview, M4CSI, http://www.mscibarra.com/about/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
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example, is a coalition of groups297 seeking to prevent Iran from becoming
a nuclear power.298 Among other things, UANI seeks to publicize
companies that are doing business in Iran, and calls on them to cease such
operations. UANI has launched recent campaigns to persuade Honeywell
International, Inc.,299 Komatsu Ltd.,300 and Maersk 0' to cease their
operations in Iran. Past initiatives have included campaigns aimed at
Caterpillar, 30 2  KPMG LLP,3 03  Ingersoll Rand Plc, 304  Huntsman
Corporation, and General Electric Company.306
UANI uses publicity to convince companies to cease doing business in
Iran. UANI maintains the Iran Business Registry, "a searchable database
of reputable media and academic reports of international business in
297. About Us, UNITED AGAINST NUCLEAR IRAN, http://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/about
(last visited Oct. 21, 2010). The United Against Nuclear Iran coalition includes human rights and
humanitarian groups, the labor movement, political advocacy and grassroots organizations and
representatives of diverse ethnicities, faith communities, political and social affiliations. Id. The author
is a member of the UANI Advisory Board.
298. Id.
299. For example, on July 8, 2010, UANI wrote to Honeywell to request that they cease doing
business in Iran. Letter from Mark D. Wallace, Ambassador, to David M. Cote, Chairman and CEO,
Honeywell International Inc., (July 8, 2010), available at http://unitedagainstnucleariran.comi/sites/
default/files/IBR%20Correspondence/4Letter toHoneywellSanctionso20Passage_07081 0.pdf
300. On July 29, 2010, UANI wrote to Komatsu to request that they cease doing business in Iran.
Letter from Mark D Wallace, Ambassador, to Kunio Noji, President and CEO, Kamatsu, Ltd., (July 29,
2010), available at http://unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sites/default/files/UANI Letter to Komatsu
07291 0.pdf
301. On July 29, 2010, UANI wrote to Maersk to request that they cease doing business in Iran.
Letter from Mark D. Wallace, Ambassador, to Nils Smedegaard Andersen, CEO, A.P. Moller - Maersk
Group, (July 29, 2010), available at http://unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sites/default/files/UANI
Letter toMaersk_072910.pdf
302. On February 11, 2010, UANI wrote to Caterpillcr to request that they cease doing business in
Iran. Letter from Mark D. Wallace, Ambassador, to James W. Owens, CEO, Caterpillar, (Feb. 1 1,
2010), available at http://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sites/default/files/letter-to caterpillar
021110.pdf.
303. On March 12, 2010, UANI wrote to KPMG to request that they cease doing business in Iran.
Letter from Mark D. Wallace, Ambassador, to Timothy P. Flynn, Chairman, KPMG LLP and KPMG
International, (Mar. 12, 2010), available at http://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sites/default/
files/IBR %20Correspondence/KPMGLetter_03 12 2010 signed.pdf,
304. On March 2, 2010, UANI wrote to Ingersoll-Rand to request that they cease doing business in
Iran. Letter from Mark D. Wallace, Ambassador, to Michael W. Lamach, President and CEO,
Ingersoll-Rand Plc, (Mar. 2, 2010), available at http://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sites/default/
files/Letter to%201ngersollRand_030210.pdf
305. On November 23, 2009, UANI wrote to Huntsman to request that they cease doing business in
Iran. Letter from Mark D. Wallace, Ambassador, to Jon M. Huntsman, Founder and Chairman,
Huntsman, (Nov. 23, 2009), available at http://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sites/default/files/
HuntsmanLetterSigned 112309.pdf
306. Some companies, for example General Electric. have signed an "Iran Business Declaration"
certifying that the company is not doing business in Iran. Declaration of Brackett B. Denniston III,
Senior Vice President and General Counsel, General Electric Company, Non-Engagement of Business




Iran."'O7 On January 12, 2010, UANI launched the Iran Disclosure Project
which identifies publicly traded companies that have failed to disclose to
investors the legal and financial issues associated with their business
dealings in Iran.30 s
Additional efforts to fill the disclosure gap come from the media and
other government agencies. For example the New York Times publishes an
interactive online listing of companies that do business in Iran and also
have government contracts called "Profiting from Iran."309 In May 2010,
the U.S. Government Accountability Office released a report listing 41
foreign firms that had commercial activity in the Iranian energy sector
between 2005 and 2009,"' and identifying seven of the firms that had
contracts with the U.S. government during those years worth almost $880
million.1
4. Public Awareness is High
Media coverage of Iran's nuclear ambitions has been intense,
especially following the Summer 2010 UN and U.S. sanctions.3 12 Reports
of Iran's sponsorship of terrorism abound. Similarly, the public is aware of
the repressive nature of President Ahmadinejad's regime, especially after
the brutal crackdown on democratic Green Movement protesters in the
wake of the contested June 2009 presidential election. On the June 22,
2010 anniversary of the murder of Neda Agha-Soltan, a global consortium
of over 100 international law scholars, human rights advocates, and former
government leaders released a report about the nuclear ambitions and
international law violations of President Ahmadinejad's regime called "The
Danger of a Nuclear, Genocidal and Rights-Violating Iran: The
Responsibility to Prevent Petition."313 There is currently speculation about
an Israeli or U.S. military attack on Iran.314 Concern about Iran is not
307. Iran Business Registry, UNITED AGAINST NUCLEAR IRAN, http://www.unitedagainstnuclear
iran.com/ibr (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
3 0 8. Id.
309. Profiting from Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/03/
06/world/iran-sanctions.html.
310. The Iranian business was identified in a Government Accountability Office review of "open
source information," including "governmental reports and information, about 200 energy trade
publications, and corporate Web site information and statements." U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-10-1163T, IRAN SANCTIONS: FIRMS REPORTED TO HAVE COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY IN THE
IRANIAN ENERGY SECTOR AND U.S. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 2 (2010), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10721 t.pdf
311. Id. at 5-6.
312. See supra Part C.
313. See generally RESPONSIBILITY TO PREVENT COALITION, THE DANGER OF A NUCLEAR,
GENOCIDAL AND RIGHTS-VIOLATING IRAN: THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PREVENT PETITION, (June 22,
2010), available at http://irwincotler.1iberal.ca/files/2010/05/2010-07-06-R2P-IRAN-REPORT.pdf.
314. Jeffrey Goldberg, The Point of No Return, ATLANTIC, Sept. 2010, at 56.
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limited to a small fraction of the population. It is worldwide, longstanding
and widespread.
Public awareness is reflected in investment patterns. "Terror-free"
investment is increasingly popular. With both Sudan and Iran in the news
in recent years, denying investment funds has become an accepted way for
the public to help isolate terrorism-sponsoring regimes.3 15 "Modeled in part
on the economic boycott of apartheid-era South Africa, 'terror-free
investing' is designed to isolate countries on the U.S. terrorism list like
Iran."'316 Companies such as Empowerment Financial Group" advertise
terror-free investment funds with names like the Roosevelt Anti-Terror
Multi Cap (Fund: BULLX). 1
Despite their defense of their Iran business, many public companies
are ceasing their operations in Iran. In August 2010, for example,
LyondellBasell Industries NV announced that it would end all business in
Iran in order to shield itself from possible U.S. sanctions.3 19 Of course, a
company spokesperson described the move as "immaterial" to
LyondellBasell's overall operations.320 Of the 142 reporting companies
identified by the author as having conducted business operations in Iran
between January 1, 2006, and January 1, 2010,321 approximately half have
either reported in periodic disclosure, or claimed in correspondence with
the SEC or an NGO, that they have ceased or are ceasing operations in
Iran.322
E. THE SEC'S PERSISTENT FAILURE TO FOLLOW THROUGH
Notwithstanding the obvious importance of the Iranian situation to the
international order, as well as the law of the United States, there is no
express requirement in Reg S-K, and no guidance or decisions applying
Rules 12b-20, 408 or 10b-5, that specifically instructs reporting companies
to disclose their operations in Iran. As discussed above both generally and
315. Howard LaFranchi, Terror- fee Investing Gains Ground in United States, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Mar. 26, 2007, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0326/p01s02-usec.html.
316. Adam Zagorin, Terror-Free Investing Aims at Iran, TIME, Feb. 07, 2007, http://www.time.com/
time/nation/article/0,859 9,1586891,00.html.
317. See About Terror-Free Investing, TERROR-FREE INVESTING, http://www.terrorfreeinvesting.com/
about.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
318. For a discussion of the Roosevelt Anti-Terror Multi-Cap by the always popular Motley Fool
site, see Selena Maranjian, An Anti-Terror Mutual Fund?, THE MOrLEY FOOL (Jan. 19, 2007),
http://www.fool.com/investing/mutual-funds/2007/01/1 9/an-antiterror-mutual-fund.aspx.
319. Spencer Swartz, LyondellBasell to End All Business in Iran Due to Sanctions, WALL ST. J.
Aug. 24, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703447004575449463727514380.
html?KEYWORDS=1yondellbasell.
320. Id.
321. Westbrook, supra note 5, at 1206-1217.
322. Seventy-two of tbe 142 companies claim to be out of or getting out of Iran. More precise
details available from the author.
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in the context of management integrity and climate change, the general
standards from Reg S-K Items 101, 103, 303 and 503(c) could require
disclosure of operations in Iran if such operations are deemed material.
However, until costs have already been imposed, by war or otherwise,
companies consistently argue that their Iranian business is relatively
insignificant to their overall bottom line and so need not be
(embarrassingly) exposed to the sunshine. Materiality comes too late.
1. Chairman Unger's Letter: Backing Down
Efforts to get the SEC to recognize the significance to investors of a
company's business in SSTs, and Iran in particular, have been going on for
many years. In April 2001, several years before the 2005 state pension
fund and auditors' letters requesting more accessible disclosure of company
operations in SSTs,323 Congressman Frank Wolf wrote to Laura S. Unger,
Acting Chairman of the SEC, to express his concerns about a recent initial
public offering concluded by PetroChina Limited3 24 that had arguably 3 25
included inadequate disclosure of the Sudanese operations of the state-
owned parent company of the issuer.326 Chairman Unger's May 2001
response 32 7 suggested "enhanced disclosure for foreign registrants doing
business in sanctioned countries."328 Chairman Unger took the position that
the SEC does not have the statutory authority to deny companies access to
the U.S. markets on the basis of their business operations in a country
subject to U.S. sanctions, 3 29 but the SEC does have the "statutory authority
to require that U.S. investors receive adequate disclosure about where the
proceeds of their securities investments are going and how they are being
used." 330
323. See discussion supra Part D.1.
324. Stephen F. Diamond, The PetroChina Syndrome: Regulating Capital Markets in the Anti-
Globalization Era, 29 J. CORP. L. 39, 45 (2003) (in the case of the PetroChina offering, the concern
surrounded a parent company investment in Sudan).
325. U.S. COMM'N ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2000), available at
http://www.uscirf.gov/images/stories/pdf/Annual-Report/2000annualreport.pdf (voicing concerns about
the adequacy of the PetroChina Limited disclosure).
326. See Letter from Frank Wolf, Congressman, U.S. House of Representatives, to Laura Unger,
Acting Chairman, SEC (Mar. 8, 2001) (on file with author). Congressman Wolf's letter also expressed
concern with respect to Talisman Energy, Inc., a Canadian company with U.S.-listed shares and
operations in Sudan. See id. Talisman subsequently withdrew from Sudan. Congressman Wolf
suggested, for example, that foreign companies seeking access to U.S. markets should disclose their
operations in SSTs, as well as those of their parent companies, subsidiaries, and affiliates. Id.
(discussing Recommendation No. 1).
327. Letter from Laura S. Unger, Acting Chairman, SEC, to Frank Wolf, Congressman, U.S. House
of Representatives (May 8, 2001), 1278 PLI/CORP 1117, 1117 [hereinafter Unger Letter].
328. See id., at 1121.
3 29. Id.
330. Id. Chairman Unger reiterated that the federal securities laws are about disclosure and making
sure that investors have "access to material information about the companies and securities in which
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Chairman Unger echoed the materiality language of TSC Industries
Inc. v. Northway, Inc.33 1 and SAB 99,332 stating that "the fact that a foreign
company is doing material business with a [sanctioned country] is, in the
SEC staff's view, substantially likely to be significant to a reasonable
investor's decision about whether to invest in that company." 3 She thus
implied that such business is material per se,334 and must be disclosed.
Chairman Unger's letter attached a memorandum prepared by David
Martin, Director of the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance, that
concluded that "existing SEC disclosure requirements might very well
warrant disclosure of a foreign company's operations in, or business
relationships with companies from, countries on" the SST list, 335 depending
on "the materiality of the financial impact of those operations and business
relationships on the company's conduct of its business."336  Director
Martin's memorandum stated, "We agree that a reasonable investor would
likely consider it significant that a foreign company raising capital in the
U.S. markets has business relationships with countries, governments or
entities with which any U.S. company would be prohibited from dealing
because of U.S. economic sanctions." 337
It was unclear whether Chairman Unger's "enhanced" disclosure
"merely committed the [SEC] to more rigorous enforcement of the existing
standard of materiality for a firm's data, or whether her letter effectively
announced a new, lower standard for the materiality of information" about
they are considering investing." Unger Letter, supra note 327, at 1121.
331. TSC Indus., 426U.S. at 449.
332. SAB 99,supra note 81.
333. Unger Letter, supra note 327, at 1121.
334. Chairman Unger's exact meaning was debated because she used the word "material" several
times in her letter but did not explicitly write that such information is material per se. See generally id.
335. Martin Memorandum, supra note 58, at 1127-1128.
336. Id. at 1128 (discussing recommendation No. 1).
337. Id. at 1129. Martin continued:
The staff will, therefore, seek information from foreign registrants about their
material business in countries on the OFAC's sanctions list and their business
relationships with countries, governments, or entities on those lists. This type of
disclosure would make available to investors additional information about
situations in which the proceeds of an offering could however indirectly benefit
countries, governments, or entities that, as a matter of U.S. foreign policy, are
off-limits to U.S. companies.
Id. Director Martin explained:
If it is reasonably likely that U.S. governmental sanctions will be imposed on the
company as a result of its operations in a particular country, this risk would need
to be disclosed if the sanctions were likely to have a material impact on the
company. Likewise, if it is reasonahly likely that public opposition to the
company would have a materially adverse effect on the operations of the
company, this risk would also need to be disclosed.
Id. (introducing the concept of probability versus magnitude, which was also part of the materiality test
articulated by Basic Inc. i. Levinsan).
60 Vol. 7:1
SUNLIGHT ON IRAN
operations in sanctioned countries like Iran."' Both Chairman Unger and
Director Martin endorsed the TSC Industries v. Northway standard of
materiality and the "longstanding SEC spin"339 on the standard that "the
reasonable investor generally focuses on matters that have affected, or will
affect, a company's profitability and financial outlook."340 However, their
assertion that a reasonable investor would likely consider operations in a
country subject to U.S. sanctions significant seemed to indicate a new
standard under which operations in a sanctioned country would be
considered material per se.34 1
The question was answered a few months later, however, when
Chairman Pitt replaced Acting Chairman Unger at the SEC. Industry
groups opposed to additional disclosure of operations in SSTs such as Iran
reported in October 2001 that Chairman Pitt had assured them that no
additional disclosure would be required. 342  The SEC stepped back from
enforcing a broad understanding of the materiality of operations in SSTs.
2. Making Disclosure Easier to Find: The Web Tool and Its Removal
In addition, even if some information is deemed material by reporting
companies and disclosed, the information is hard for investors to find. The
SEC's EDGAR database in which company disclosure is posted by the
SEC is not easy to use, and only allows "full text" searches for the past four
years.
The SEC has attempted to make it easier for investors to find the
disclosure that companies make about their activities in SSTs, but with
little result. On June 25, 2007, the SEC introduced the Software Tool for
Investors Seeking Information on Companies' Activities in Countries
Known to Sponsor Terrorism (the "Web Tool").343 In the 22 days it was
338. Note, Should the SEC Expand Nonfinancial Disclosure Requirements?, 115 HARV. L. REV.
1433, 1433-34 (2002).
339. Id. at 1434.
340. Martin Memorandum, supra note 58, at 1128. Director Martin went on to write, "Because
securities are financial investment vehicles, the materiality of a foreign company's operations in a
particular country and its business relationships with companies from that country will generally depend
on whether these operations or relationships have had, or are likely to have, a financial impact on the
company." Id. at 1128-29.
341. Note, supra note 338, at 1434.
342. See Gary G. Yerkey, SEC Will Not Seek New Data from Foreign Firms on Overseas Dealings,
33 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1441 (Oct. 8, 2001) (describing the triumphant demeanor of the
President of the National Foreign Trade Council after meeting with Chairman Pitt and receiving
assurances of SEC forbearance).
343. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Adds Software Tool for Investors Seeking
Information on Companies' Activities in Countries Known to Sponsor Terrorism (June 25, 2007),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007412l.htm. The web Tool did not change the definition of
what had to be disclosed. The web Tool merely made any information disclosed by the issuer more
accessible to investors. The database was organized by country (SST) and provided direct links to
specific companies' EDGAR disclosures. See Paul Michalski & Kimberley S. Drexler, A Snapshot of
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online, the Web Tool had over 150,000 hits. Iran was the country most
frequently "clicked on." 3 44
Unsurprisingly, the Web Tool was widely criticized. 45 Many
reporting companies opposed the database as a "blacklist" because simply
being listed in a part of the SEC website identified with SSTs was
prejudicial to them.3 46  The Web Tool was criticized as over-inclusive
because "it captured (and potentially stigmatized) any issuer that disclosed
even benign activities in [an SST]," and as under-inclusive because it only
included issuers' 2006 annual reports (Form 10-K or Form 20-F) and not
disclosure made after those reports. 347
The SEC removed the Web Tool from its site after just a few weeks3 4 8
and issued the Concept Release on Mechanisms to Access Disclosures
Relating to Business Activities in or with Countries Designated as State
Sponsors of Terrorism (the "Concept Release"). 3 49 In the Concept Release,
the SEC set out its understanding of the disclosure requirements with
respect to business activities in or with SSTs:
The federal securities laws do not impose a specific disclosure
requirement that addresses business activities in or with a country based
upon its designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. However, the
federal securities laws do require disclosure of business activities in or
with a State Sponsor of Terrorism if this constitutes material information
that is necessary to make a company's statements, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading. 350
the SEC and Global Security Risk Disclosure Today, in How TO COMPLETE YOUR SECURITIES
OFFERINGS ON A TIMELY BASIS 2008, at 135 (2008).
344. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement by SIC Chairman Christopher Cox
Concerning Companies' Activities in Countries Known to Sponsor Terrorism (July 20, 2007),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-138.htm.
345. Congressman Barney Frank, Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, wrote to
Chairman Christopher Cox of the SEC that "I hope you will give serious consideration to devising
either a more rigorous, materiality-based methodology for developing the list you are presenting to
investors or else eliminating the webpage entirely." Press Release, House Comm. on Fin. Servs., Frank
Letter to Cox Regarding SEC List of Terrorist-Financing States (July 13, 2007), http://www.house.gov/
apps/list/press/financialsvcs-dem/press071307.shtml; See also Rachelle Younglai, SEC Member
Criticizes 'Terrorist' Watch List, REUTERS, July 19, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/government
FilingsNews/idUSN1920647120070719 (reporting that Commissioner Paul Atkins had stated in an
interview with Reuters that the SEC needed either to fix or to withdraw the Web Tool as soon as
possible).
346. In almost all cases, the activity described was lawful under applicable, usually non-U.S., law.
In some cases (for example, Western Union) the activity was explicitly licensed by OFAC.
347. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, SEC DISCLOSURE OF BUSINESS RELATED TO STATE SPONSORS
OF TERRORISM 3 (2007), available at http://www.adrbnymellon.com/files/SO21523.pdf.
348. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra note 344.
349. Concept Release on Mechanisms to Access Disclosures Relating to Business Activities in or
with Countries Designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism, Securities Act Release No. 8860, Exchange
Act Release No. 56803, 72 Fed. Reg. 65862 (proposed Nov. 23, 2007).
350. Id. at 65863 (citing Rule 408 and Rule 12b-20).
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The Concept Release reiterated the SEC's commitment to the TSC
Industries Inc. v. Northway Inc. and Basic Inc. v. Levinson definition of
materiality ("[T]he Supreme Court has determined information to be
material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would
consider the information important in making an investment decision or if
the information would significantly alter the total mix of available
information").3 ' Even in the context to activities in SSTs, the Concept
Report stated:
The materiality standard applicable to a company's activities in or with
State Sponsors of Terrorism is the same materiality standard applicable
to all other corporate activities. Any such material information not
covered by a specific rule or regulation must be disclosed if necessary to
make the required statements, in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading. The materiality standard's
extensive regulatory and judicial history helps companies and their
counsel to interpret and apply it consistently, and we remain committed
to employing this standard to company disclosure regarding business
activities in or with State Sponsors of Terrorism.352
Comment letters varied, but those submitted by larger companies and
trade groups generally praised materiality as a standard that elicited needed
disclosure, while those submitted by institutional investors and individuals
generally favored a more explicit statement of the materiality of such
operations, and increased disclosure.353 The Comment period ended on
January 22, 2008, but the SEC has not followed up on the Concept Release.
3. Survey of SEC Inquiries and Company Responses: One Step Forward
and Two Steps Back
The most obvious example of the SEC's failure to enforce the full
(i.e., both qualitative and quantitative) meaning of materiality, however,
can be found in the correspondence it exchanges with reporting companies
with business activities in Iran. SEC staff members frequently send letters
to reporting companies with inquiries regarding their periodic disclosure
documents. Some of those letters ask companies about their reported
operations in SSTs.
The number, although not necessarily the effectiveness, of such letters
has increased since the 2004 establishment of the SEC Office of Global
351. Concept Release, supra note 349, at 65863 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson and TSC Industries,
Inc. v. Northway, Inc.).
352. Id. The Concept Release asked whether the SEC should continue to interpret materiality in the
context of SSTs in the same way it does when reviewing disclosure related to other corporate activities
that are not covered by a specific rule or regulation and whether information about companies' activities
in, or with, SSTs was important to investors in making investment decisions. Id.
353. Westbrook, supra note 5, at 1201-02.
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Security Risk (the OGSR).354 The OGSR was tasked with increasing "the
investing public's access to the information it needs about any public
company to make an informed investment decision, including material
information about global security risk"" by ensuring that companies listed
on U.S. exchanges disclose whether they are doing business in SSTs such
as Iran.356
354. The OGSR was established as part of the Division of Corporation Finance in response to a
directive in the House-Senate conference reports that accompanied the Fiscal Year 2004 appropriations
bill that funded the SEC. See H.R. REP. No. 108-401, at 639 (2003) (Conf Rep.); H.R. REP. NO. 108-
221, at 151 (2003) (Conf. Rep.). The House Committee Report that instructed the SEC to establish the
OGSR specified:
The duties of this office shall include, but not be limited to: (1) establishing a
process by which the SEC identifies all companies on U.S. exchanges operating
in State Department designated terrorist-sponsoring states; (2) ensuring that all
companies sold on U.S. exchanges operating in State Department-designated
terrorist-sponsoring states are disclosing such activities to investors; (3)
implementing enhanced disclosure requirements based on the asymmetric nature
of the risk to corporate share value and reputation stemming from business
interests in these higher risk countries; (4) coordinating with other government
agencies to ensure the sharing of relevant information across the Federal
government; and (5) initiating a global dialogue to ensure that foreign
corporations whose shares are traded in the United States are properly disclosing
their activities in State Department-designated terrorist-sponsoring states to
American investors.
H.R. REP. No. 108-221, at 151 (2003).
355. Qffice of Global Security Risk, SEC.GOv (Mar. 2, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/
globalsecrisk.htm
356. New SEC Office to Ensure Firms Disclose Connections to States Sponsoring Terrorism, 36
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 241 (Feb. 9, 2004). On March 31, 2004, then-SEC Chairman William
Donaldson described the OGSR's objectives, "to identify companies whose activities raise concern
about global security risks that are material to investors; to obtain appropriate disclosure where merited;
and to share information as necessary and appropriate with other key government agencies responsible
for tracking terrorist financing." Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies Appropriations for 2005. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, and
State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations 108th Cong. 488 (2004)
(statement of William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC). Chairman Donaldson also testified:
[T]the Office of Global Security Risk will focus on asymmetric risk by assisting
review staff in giving consideration to whether U.S. or foreign companies that
are registered with the SEC have operations or other exposure with or in areas of
the world that may subject it and its investors to material risks, trends or
uncertainties. This consideration would include whether a company has
operations in a country or area of activity where political, economic or other
risks exist that are material, or whether a company faces public or government
opposition, boycotts, litigation, or similar circumstances that are reasonably
likely to have a material adverse impact on a company's financial condition or
results of operations.
Id. In 2005 the OGSR began sending letters to companies asking about their operations in SSTs such as
Iran and thdlrethat the companies were making. Between September 1, 2006 and September
1, 2010, the OGSR sent over 300 letters inquiring about operations in Iran. Note, however, that in
many cases multiple letters were sent to the same company. See Full -Text Search, SEC EDGAR
DATABASE, http://searchwww.sec.gov/EDGARFSClient/jsp/EDGAR MainAccess.jsp?search text=%
22officeo20o0f%20globalo20security% 20risk% 220 AND% 201ran&sort= Date& form Type= FormUP
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The SEC often requests that a company analyze the materiality of its
contacts with Iran, and instructs:
You should address materiality in quantitative terms, including the
approximate dollar amount of your revenues, assets and liabilities and
associated with . . . Iran. . . . Please also address materiality in terms of
qualitative factors that a reasonable investor would deem important in
making an investment decision, including the potential impact of
corporate activities upon your reputation and share value.357
Some of the SEC inquiry letters also include language such as:
As you may be aware, various state and municipal governments,
universities, and other investors have proposed or adopted divestment or
similar initiatives regarding investment in companies that do business
with U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism. Your materiality
analysis should address the potential impact of the investor sentiment
evidenced by such actions directed toward companies that have
operations associated with Iran . . . . In this regard, we note that this
investor sentiment does not turn solely on the legality of the operations
associated with those countries.358
In order to evaluate the arguments that reporting companies are
(apparently successfully) making about the lack of materiality of their
Iranian operations, a survey of company letters 359 was undertaken for this
Article. The survey reviewed 421 letters written by reporting companies to
the SEC between September 1, 2006 and September 1, 2010, in response to
SEC inquiries about Iranian operations. The letters are all publicly
available on the EDGAR database.360
Of the 421 letters, 160 (the Responses) discussed the materiality of
their activities in Iran. Not a single Response identified the operations as
material. Ten of the Responses stated that the company earned no revenue
at all from Iran. Of remaining 150 Responses, 140 (93 percent) of them
argued explicitly that their operations in Iran were not material because
LOAD&isAdv=true&stemming=true&numResults=10&numResults=10 (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
357. Memorandum from Schlumberger Limited (Schlumberger N.V.) to The Securities and
Exchange Commission, (June 22, 2010) available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/87347/
000119312510145145/filenamel.htm (reprinting the question to which the company is responding).
The Schlumberger memorandum is also typical in that a great deal of its response was kept confidential.
Nevertheless, in November 2010, it was reported that Schlumberger, believed to be the last Western oil
services firm working in Iran, had privately pledged to U.S. State Department officials that it would pull
out of Iran when its current contracts are complete. Farah Stockman, Oil Firm Says It Will Withdraw
from Iran, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 12, 2010, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2010/11/12/
oil firm says it will withdraw from iran/?page=full.
358. Letter from Frank B. Wyatt, II, General Counsel, CommScope, Inc. to Cecelia Blye, Chief,
Office of Global Security Risk, SEC, (Jun. 14, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/1035884/000119312510138925/filenamel.htm (reprinting the question to which the company is
responding).
359. On file with the author.
360. They are, however, difficult to identify and search using EDGAR, which continues to be a
cumbersome tool.
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they represented a small percentage of company's overall revenue.
The Responses also made other, non-quantitative, assertions related to
the materiality of Iranian operations. These discussions tended to be less
frequent, and were often brief and conclusory.3 61  The most common
arguments or answers to SEC questions that did not focus solely on
percentage of total revenues were as follows:
* 39 Responses (26 percent) claimed that the company's investors do
not care about its operations in Iran. As evidence of investor
apathy, the Responses cited things like the lack of inquiries by
investors,362  the lack of investor questions on the subject in
conference calls,363 the lack of follow up by investors on inquiries
that they did make,364 the lack of investor divestment. 65 Some
responses claimed that investors understand or expect that the
company's business would include operations in Iran.166
* 69 Responses (46 percent) asserted that the Iranian activities posed
no risk to investors.
* 84 Responses (56 percent) mentioned the lack of reputational risk
of the company's operations in Iran.
361. See, e.g., Letter from Fabjo de Oliveira Barbosa, Chief Financial Officer, Vale S.A., to Cecilia
Blye, Chief, Office of Global Security Risk, SEC (Apr. 6, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/917851/000090342310000207/filename I .htm ("In both
quantitative and qualitative terms, we believe our contacts with Iran and Cuba are not material and do
not constitute an investment risk for our security holders. Due to the routine nature and extremely
limited extent of these contacts, we believe they are not qualitatively material to our reputation or our
share value. . . . In each of the past three fiscal years, . . . our aggregate sales to Iranian customers have
represented less than I% of our total operating revenues . . ..").
362. See, e.g., Letter from Richard S. Aldrich, Jr., Skadden Arps, on behalf of Fibria Celulose S.A.,
to Cecilia Blye, Chief, Office of Global Security Risk, SEC, at (May 6, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1l1l10649/000119312510106926/filename I .htm; Letter from
Virgil Z. Hlus, Clark Wilson LLP, on behalf of KHD Humboldt Wedag International Inc., to John Cash,
SEC (Jan. 7, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/16859/0001085037100000
14/filenamel.htm; Letter from Michael P. Going, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, CNH
Global N.V., to Cecilia Blye, Chief, Office of Global Security Risk, SEC (Dec. 7, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1024519/000119312509248665/filenamel .htm.
363. See, e.g., Letter from Richard F. Chandler, Jr., Senior Vice President, General Counsel and
Secretary, Smith International to H. Roger Schwall, SEC (Jun. 23, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/721083/000089882210000416/filenamelhtm.
364. See, e.g., Letter from Eric I Cohen, Terex Corporation, to Cecilia Blye, Chief, SEC Office of
Global Security Risk, SEC (Aug. 4, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/97216/
000009721609000170/filenameI.htm.
365. See, e.g., Letter from Victoria D. Harker, Chief Financial Officer, The AIS Corporation, to
Cecilia Blye, Chief, Office of Global Security Risk, SEC (Jan. 4, 2010), available at
http://www sec gov/Archives/edgar/data/874761/000119312510000500/filenamel1Ihtm
366. See, e.g., Letter from Fernando Ramirez Mazarredo, Chief Financial Officer, Repsol YPF, to
Jill S. Davis, SEC (Sept. 28, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/847838/0000




* 68 Responses (45 percent) mentioned the potential impact on share
value from the Iranian operations. All but two367 of them, however,
concluded that there was no potential impact on share value.
* 44 Responses (29 percent) claimed that the company was operating
in compliance with all applicable laws.
* 29 Responses (19 percent) asserted that the particular products or
services that the company offers in Iran are innocuous or even
helpful.
* 20 Responses (13 percent) clarified that the company has no
dealings with the Iranian government.
As an emblematic example of the Responses, BHP Billiton's May
2010 letter noted:
We believe that BHP Billiton's contacts with Cuba and Iran do not
constitute a material investment risk to BHP Billiton securityholders . .
the nature and value of these contacts is not significant to the results or
prospects of BHP Billiton's business.... We do not see evidence that
any significant portion of our global investor base would regard our
dealings with Cuba and Iran described above as important in making an
investment decision. We do not believe that the disclosure of such
activities is likely to adversely affect our reputation or the value of our
368securities.
In February 2010, France Telecom, responding to a similar request for
information, asserted:
France Telecom's contacts with Iran, Syria, Sudan and Cuba are a de
minimis part of France Telecom's activities. Accordingly, we do not
believe that a reasonable investor would consider France Telecom's
current business activities in the four countries to be material from either
a quantitative or qualitative standpoint. We note that U.S. sanctions
programs related to each of the four countries permit, to varying degrees,
activities in connection with the provision of telecommunications
services related to these countries.36 9
Overall, the Responses seem to be controlled by a small estimated
financial impact of the activities in Iran. The small financial impact leads
367. Letter from Rong Guangdao, Chairman, Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical Company to Cecilia
Blye, Chief, Office of Global Security Risk, SEC (Jun. 24, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/908732/000119312510145390/filenamel.htm (suggesting that an institutional
investor with substantial interests may impact share value by divesting); Letter from Junichi
Matsumoto, Executive Vice President and CFO, Mitsui & Co., Ltd, to Anne Nguyen Parker, Branch
Chief, Division of Corporate Finance, SEC (Jan. 16, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/67099/000119312509007091/filenamel.htm (noting that many
things impact share value so the company cannot tell).
368. Letter from Alex Vanselow, Chief Financial Officer, BHP Billiton Ltd., to Ms Cecilia D. Blye,
Chief Office of Global Security Risk, U.S. SEC (May 11, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/ edgar/data/Si11809/000095017210000017/filenamel .htm.
369. Letter from St6phane Pallez, France Telecom, to Cecelia Blye, Office of Global Security Risk,
SEC (Feb.17, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1 038143/00013081791000
0015/filenamel .htm.
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to a determination that the activities are not material, and therefore do not
need to be disclosed.7 In the Responses, the quantitative materiality
analysis is dispositive.
In addition, there is no indication that SEC correspondence is having
any impact on the level or quality of disclosure by reporting companies
with operations in Iran."' The SEC rarely suggests that a company add any
disclosure of operations in Iran. It is conceivable that the SEC letters bring
the issue to the companies' attention and subtly encourage a change in
policy. However, it is also possible that SEC's continuing acceptance of
companies' narrow materiality arguments in the letters, and the resulting
incomplete disclosure, is counterproductive. The letters neither aspire to
nor succeed in applying a broad standard of materiality to the challenge of
company operations in Iran.372
4. Now What?
Thus, companies may use the materiality standard to avoid disclosure
of their operations in Iran. In response to questions during her July 2010
testimony before the House Committee on Financial Services,373 Chairman
Schapiro reportedly stated that a company's "contacts with Iran that may
lead to liability or community sanctions are something that would need to
be disclosed." 374  In response to questions about why the Web Tool had
been removed, Chairman Schapiro noted that the tool had been over-
inclusive, but that with respect to the newest Iran sanctions, "Do nothing is
not in our vocabulary."375
The SEC is again under pressure to require disclosure of operations in
Iran from legislators. Rep. Gary Ackerman (D.-NY) sent Chairman
370. See, e.g., Letter from Kevin E. Hisko, Corporate Sec'y, Lundin Mining Corp., to Cecilia D.
Blye, Chief, Office of Global Sec. Risk, SEC (Oct. 16, 2007); Letter from John D. Soriano, Vice
President-Compliance & Deputy Gen. Counsel, Ingersoll-Rand Co., Ltd., to Cecilia D. Blye, Chief,
Office of Global Sec. Risk, SEC (Sept. 5, 2008).
371. See generally Westbrook, supra note 5. As a matter of general guidance, however, the letters
are worth little; they are not meant to apply to any company except the one to which they are addressed,
they are not always uploaded onto EDGAR, and they are frequently redacted.
372. The SIC contends that it is operating within the traditional meaning of materiality. As a
matter of practice, this is financially determined.
373. Oversight of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission: Evaluating Present Reforms and
Future Challenge. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government-
Sponsored Enterprises oJthe I1 Comm. on Financial Services, 11Ith Cong. (2010) (testimony of Mary
L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC). Note, however, that the discussion of Iran was in response to questions,
and not part of Chairman Schapiro's prepared testimony.
374. Fawn Johnson, SEC Writing Disclosure Rules in the Wake of Iran Sanctions Law, Dow JONES
NEwSwiRS, Jul. 20, 2010, vailahle at http://www foxhusinesscom/markets/2010/07/20/sec-writing-
disclosure-rules-wake-iran-sanctions-law. Chairman Schapiro also reportedly said that the SEC is
writing rules to make it clear that investors and companies cannot be sued for divesting from firms that




Schapiro a letter on July 20, 2010, stating that "U.S. investors need to know
if the companies and funds in which they are investing face potential Iran-
related sanctions, and U.S. firms need equally to recognize their fiduciary
obligations to investors." 37 6  Rep. Ted Deutch, who introduced the Iran
Transparency and Accountability Act in July 2010, also sent a letter to
Chairman Schapiro urging the SEC to clarify or strengthen reporting
requirements for companies doing material business in Iran, or to create
new reporting requirements that would force companies to disclose ties to
Iran. Congressman Deutch noted that current regulations allow companies
to claim their business dealings in Iran are not "material" and therefore, not
required to be reported.377 There have also been calls for the SEC to issue
an interpretive release, presumably along the lines of the one issued for
climate change risks.3 78
At least for the present, the bottom line is that a company's operations
in Iran are material and must be disclosed, if, and when, sanctions in the
regulations impose a significant and quantifiable financial risk. There is
also, now, an undeniable reputational risk that is linked to the risk that a
company's share price will fall if any, even de minimis, activity by a
company in Iran is made public. 3 79 There is a duty to disclose such risks if
376. Oversight of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 373 (statement of Rep.
Gary Ackerman, Member, H. Comm. On Financial Services). Rep. Ackerman noted:
A nuclear Iran poses an existential threat to the United States and its allies, and
companies must be held accountable for assisting Iran in its determination to
develop nuclear capabilities and shun the international community. So what
does Iran have to do with our capital markets? The potential for American
investors to suffer material losses if their investments are in firms determined to
be in violation of the new sanctions is very real. As Chairman Schapiro knows,
the SEC has a very important role to play under the Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act. American investors need to know
if the companies and funds in which they invest face potential - and substantial -
Iran-related sanctions. As the watchdog of our markets and exchanges, the SEC
will be tasked with ensuring that investors have ready access to information
pertaining to any potential sanctions the U.S. exchange-listed firms and funds
with which they have investments will be subject to. Madame Chairman, this
morning I presented you with a letter asking for your attention to this issue and
to ensuring that American investors are forewarned about potential exposure to
significant losses.
Id.; see also Press Release, Congressman Gary Ackerman, Ackerman Calls for SEC To Empower
American Investors, Prevent Americans from Investing in Iran (Jul. 20, 2010), available at
http://ackerman.house.gov/index.cfm?sectionid=194&sectiontree=4,194&itemid=1176.
377. Press Release, Ted Deutch for Congress, supra note 268.
378. Letter from Amb. Mark D. Wallace, UANI, to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, (May 12,
2010) available at http://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sites/default/files/IBR%20Correspondence/
LetterjtoMarySchapiroSEC-signed.pdf.
379. The SEC endorses market reaction as an indicator of materiality, which allows management
and financial advisors to be 'second-guessed' after the fact for their materiality judgments. Ching Ling
Lee, supra note 57, at 669. Materiality determinations are therefore "subject to scrutiny with the gloss
of hindsight." Marc I. Steinberg & Jason B. Myers, Lurking in the Shadows: The Hidden Issues of the
Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation FD, 27 J. CORP. L. 173, I189 (2002). The effect on
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they are material, and they are now likely to be material because of the
amount of money it can cost a company to conduct business in Iran. But
by waiting until doing business in Iran imposes costs in fact, the securities
laws have failed to serve the investing public.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE PROBLEM WITH A REDUCTIVE
STANDARD OF MATERIALITY AND
WHAT CAN BE DONE
A. THE BIG PICTURE: WHY A REDUCTIVE STANDARD OF MATERIALITY IS
WRONG
1. Materiality Should Reflect Real Investor Concerns
Reasonable investors consider more than current accounting
important. A review of the manner in which the securities laws dealt with
management integrity and climate change and are dealing with business in
Iran suggests, in practice, that only information that has an undeniable,
significant, and presently quantifiable financial impact is required to be
disclosed.38  Under the SEC's current, reductive interpretation of the
doctrine, materiality is a fig leaf for secrecy.
This is a problem. Investors care about more than presently
quantifiable risks,3 8 ' and the SEC is failing investors by excusing
companies from disclosing issues for which accounting is uncertain.
Of course, at some point, investor, governmental, international, and
NGO action with respect to Iran becomes overwhelming. A company's
activities in Iran become such a financial and legal risk and such a
reputational liability, that they do have to be disclosed.382 This is due,
however, to the clear financial impact of such operations on a company's
market price is a standard of materiality in a number of foreign jurisdictions, including Australia, the
European Community and Hong Kong. Li-Wen Lin, supra note 152, at 3 -5 (noting that corporate
social and environmental disclosure requirements have been introduced into corporate or securities laws
in France, Denmark, Norway, and the United Kingdom).
380. Of course, climate change and management integrity are just two examples. Investor demand
has triggered disclosure of a host of other corporate social responsibility (or "corporate social and
environmental") disclosures. Social information that is being disclosed includes, for example, issues
concerning labor rights, human rights, community relations, consumer protection, philanthropy, or
political contributions. Li-Wen Lin, supra note 152, at 3. Voluntary corporate social responsibility
reporting has surged. John M Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theory
Versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1, 4 5 (2005)
(focusing on new UK CSR disclosure requirements).
381. As it has been phrased, "it is not plausible that a citizenry that votes across a political spectrum
reflecting all combinations of narrow self-interest and altruism should, upon calling its brokers, become
a purely profit-driven mass." Note, supra note 338, at 1438.




bottom line, to simple quantitative calculations.
Some scholars would not find this a problem. Historically some have
held the view that stockholders "conform to the rational wealth-maximizer
paradigm of neoclassical economic theory."3 83  John Fedders, Former
Director of Enforcement of the SEC, argued for a strictly economic
approach to mandatory disclosure and materiality, asserting in 1998 that
investors are:
[I]n it for the dollars. Ordinarily, investors dismiss ethical and moral
norms when saving and investing. ..The common interest of investors is
a reasonable return on savings: this economic interest is their sole focus.
Thus they are concerned with information that helps them make
decisions that they believe will add value to their portfolios.
Consequently, the SEC's disclosure policies must be oriented to
regulatingaccording to quantitative standards, not standards based on
morality. :
But these views fail to account for the motivations and requirements
of modern investors. After 9/11, a terrorism-sponsoring nearly nuclear
regime in Iran is not a vague distant threat for the public. With trillions of
dollars invested in socially responsible funds, it is evident that reasonable
investors consider more than current financial performance important. In
arguing that there are no purely economic or purely social investors,
Professor Williams suggested that even the most profit-driven shareholder
would balk at investing in a slave-labor camps, assuming such camps were
legal in another country.3 85 The reasoning in the surveyed Responses
suggests that a company with a non-U.S. subsidiary that operates or does
business with such a camp would not disclose such activities unless the
resulting income was a significant part of the company's overall revenue,
or clearly, imminently likely to attract costly regulatory sanctions or
widespread share price-destroying divestment. 38 6
2. Limiting Materiality to Significant Effects on Revenues Undercuts
Other U.S. Policies
Limiting materiality to significant effects on revenues may also
undercut fundamental policies of the United States. Laws such as ISA and
CISADA, the Secretary of State's designation of Iran as an SST, and the
OFAC regulations were all put into place to isolate the Iranian regime.
Helping companies who do business in Iran get access to capital in the
United States, without disclosing that business, runs counter to U.S.
383. Note, supra note 338, at 1437.
384. Fedders, supra note 118, at 89.
385. Williams, supra note 13, at 1276.
386. Hopefully, this is an exaggeration, but it is not encouraging to watch what it takes to trigger
disclosure of investment that aids the Iranian regime. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 314 (arguing that
an Israeli attack on Iran may he imminent).
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policies and laws which U.S. investors (primarily citizens) presumably
support.
3. Exclusive Reliance on Quantification Implausibly Presumes Sound
Accounting and Efficient Markets
The SEC's acceptance of the Responses, and their reductive view of
materiality, places a great deal of faith in corporate accounting, and
assumes that all information important to investors will be correctly
reflected in share prices. The last decade, from the implosion of Enron
Corporation to that of American International Group, Inc., has
demonstrated the weakness of those assumptions.
The 2001-2002 corporate accounting scandals involving Enron,
WorldCom, and Adelphia Communications Corporation were a grim
reminder that financial statements may misrepresent the results of
operations to shareholders and investors. Arthur Andersen, a prestigious
accounting firm that had been founded in 1913, was liquidated and became
a symbol of fraud perpetrated through financial statements. Congress
responded with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to restore legitimacy and reliability
to financial statements, and the accounting profession was subjected to new
regulatory oversight.387 Despite these measures, accounting practices have
again come under fire with the recent financial crisis. Now more than ever,
investors recognize that there is more relevant information than what
appears in the financial statements.
Of course, any disclosure-based system operates on the assumption
that better information, including financial information, will help buyers
and sellers of securities make better judgments and therefore produce more
accurate prices. 88 However, the financial crisis in recent years also
confirmed suspicions389 that the price mechanism simply does not work that
well.390
387. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act established the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB), a private sector, not-for-profit organization designed to oversee auditors of public
companies. See generally About the PCAOB, PCAOB, http://pcaobus.org/About/Pages/default.aspx
(last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
388. H.R. REP. No. 98-910, vol. 1, at 563, 574-75 (1977) (for the argument that disclosure should
be used to affect corporate social behavior is thus "market faithful"); Kellye Y. Testy, What Is the
'New' Corporate Social Responsibility?: Linking Progressive Corporate Law with Progressive Social
Movements, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1227, 1236 (2002) (describing Cynthia Williams' corporate social
disclosure scholarship). As strikingly demonstrated by the portfolio rebalancing of the last years, price
reflects many things besides the current financial performance of a given company.
389. See generally DAVID A. WESTBROOK, OUT OF CRISIS: RETHINKING OUR FINANCIAL CRISIS
(2010). A full analysis of the problems with the hope for efficient markets is beyond the scope of this
Article.
390. The efficiency of capital markets has, of course, always had a significant number of critics,
notably Warren Buffett, who has repeatedly mocked the efficient market theory in his writings to the
Berkshire Hathaway shareholders. See, e.g., WARREN E. BUFFEIT, THE LssA\YS OF WARREN BUFFETT:
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In addition, allowing companies to disclose only limited information
based on current quantifiable effect on revenues or profits supposes an
efficient market that the recent financial crisis and subsequent volatility has
shown to be a myth. Without regulatory enforcement of disclosure of
information that is important to investors, though not likely to affect prices
until the medium to long term, there is no reason to think that the risk of
regulatory sanctions, divestiture, public shaming, or even war will be
accurately incorporated into share price.
4. A Limited Interpretation ofMateriality Is at Odds with the Statutes, the
Supreme Court and the SEC's Own Guidelines
The legislative history and Supreme Court rulings have historically
emphasized the broad character of materiality. As this article has
demonstrated, Congress enacted the securities laws in an effort to protect
investors by providing information and prohibiting fraud. The 1929 Stock
Market Crash amply demonstrated the manipulation and misrepresentation
possible in the securities markets, and Congress intended to require
"sunlight" on corporate behavior, not a simple spotlight. The plain
meaning of the statute argues for more than a reductive understanding.
The Supreme Court clarified in TSC Industries Inc. v. Northway Inc.
and Basic Inc. v. Levinson that materiality is broad in scope, and that
doubts as to the materiality of information should be decided in favor of
disclosure.39' Ease of application is not an excuse for ignoring the purpose
of the securities laws. 39 2
In the same vein, SAB 99 explicitly explains that there are both
qualitative and quantitative aspects of materiality, and that numerical,
bright line tests of financial impact cannot be dispositive. Recognizing
only issues that are significant on a company's financial statements is just
the kind of bright line approach that the Supreme Court warned against and
SAB 99 rejected. A limited interpretation of materiality is at odds with the
statutes, the Supreme Court and the SEC's own guidelines.
5. A Narrow Standard Absolves the SEC ofIts Core Responsibilities
Although a narrow, limited definition of materiality might at first
glance seem like the more conservative approach on the part of the SEC, it
is actually just the opposite. Keeping information out of the marketplace
increases risk, and represents a subtle abdication by the SEC of its
LESSONS FOR CORPORATE AMERICA (Lawrence A. Cunningham ed., 2d ed. 2008) at 87-88 (calling the
theory "foolish").
391. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 446, 448.
392. Basic, 485 U.S. at 236.
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responsibilities to protect investors. By not requiring companies to disclose
information until there is a clear financial impact, the SEC "outsources"
doctrinal interpretation to the array of accountants and attorneys hired by
the reporting companies. In addition, by waiting to act on non-quantifiable
information, the SEC also allows other institutions to take the lead in
assessing what information is important to the markets. The SEC has
passed the buck to EPA regulations, U.S. sanctions, OFAC designations,
state pension fund investment guidelines, and NGO initiatives. By waiting
until costs have already been imposed by other institutions or regulations,
so that the impacts of ongoing operations in Iran are undeniable, the SEC
avoids its responsibilities.
6. A Reductive Standard of Materiality Does Not Protect Investors in
Changing Circumstances
A narrow approach to requiring disclosure of investor priorities means
that non-financial investor priorities are recognized only after the concerns
become undeniably financially significant to the company, and therefore
material in accounting terms.393 As a result, and as described by Professor
Williams, there is a recurring "logical difficulty" that compromises the
rather uncontroversial investor protection purposes of the federal securities
law. If a concern is "merely social" concern, it is deemed beyond the scope
of the SEC mandate, but if it rises to the level of an economic concern, it is
deemed properly handled by the existing regulations/scope of materiality
and must be disclosed.394 But what about the investors who are caught
when a social concern becomes an economic concern?
By not requiring disclosure of information about a company's
operations in Iran until Iranian operations are such a liability that they
significantly impact risk and share price, the SEC enables companies to
attract investors who are not adequately apprised of issues until those costs
are imposed. This means that investors who buy when an issue is "merely"
social do so without the benefits of disclosure. Only after costs have been
imposed on the company, and investors harmed thereby, does such an issue
become material. 395
393. And therefore, proponents of social concerns quite logically emphasize the economic impact
in order to obtain disclosure. See supra Part II.B.5. for a discussion of this in the context of climate
change disclosure petitions.
394. Williams, supra note 13, at 1252.
395. Indeed, this is what happened to investors in Barclays Bank Plc. See discussion supra note 7.
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B. RECOMMENDATION: THE SEC SHOULD REAFFIRM ITS TRADITIONAL
BROAD UNDERSTANDING OF MATERIALITY
The SEC should reaffirm its traditional broad understanding of
materiality as information that there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable person would consider important. At a minimum, the SEC can
cease accepting the quantitatively determined materiality analysis like
those surveyed in the Responses. In addition, the SEC might wish to
consider issuing an interpretive release or amending Reg S-K to require
specific disclosure of business operations in Iran.396
The U.S. federal securities laws have been held up as a model of
disclosure-based regulation, of a flexible and effective way to discipline a
market and protect investors. However, a disclosure system is only a
strong and successful form of regulation if companies have to disclose
important information. If companies are allowed to refuse to disclose, then
a disclosure-based system is investors' worst enemy. They have no
substantive protections and no information. The system fails them.
The SEC undoubtedly has the power to enforce a broader
understanding of materiality. The SEC can determine that operations in
Iran are material to investors, regardless of whether an adverse financial
impact is currently demonstrable. The statute allows this, the legislative
history encourages it, the Supreme Court has clarified it, and the SEC has
done it in other contexts. The 2000s provided tough lessons for financial
regulators and investors, many of which related to being ill-informed. We
should all understand the damage that can result from a reductionist, non-
interventionist approach to information for investors.
The SEC should assert its broad understanding of materiality, and
evaluate company disclosure accordingly, for reasons beyond investor
protection (as important as that is). A broader standard will produce
disclosure, and likely cessation, of company operations in Iran, and may
well help to slow, or even dissuade, Iran in its quest for destabilizing
nuclear weapons. The broader standard may even help to avoid more
bloodshed.
396. In fact, a logical amendment would require disclosure of any operations in any country that the
Secretary of State has designated a state sponsor of terrorism. This is a request that UANI has made to
the SEC in the past. Letter from Amb. Mark D. Wallace, supra note 378 (including a model Reg S-K
provision).
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